Iran Hopes

2005-10-04T20:24:00.000-07:00

The regime is planning to release 15 of "less problematic" students from Evin prison. The Ministry of Sciencses is producing a list to this effect! How bizarre! As if all this time the regime had not been aware of how many students there were in its prisons! In any event, it is yet unknown as to who is going to make it to the list. Will, for example, Akbar and Manouchehr Mohammadi, and Ahmad Batebi who were arrested during the student uprising in 1999, be released too? I suspect not!
Why this decision all of a sudden? For obvious reasons. They - i.e. the hardliner elements of the government in the executive and the judiciary- just want to make a democratic gesture, saying that "hey! look Khatami was not able to get students out of prison, but we were"! Besides, they are really struggling hard these days to at least get relieved from the international pressure over their atrocious human rights record. But measures as this latest one are only TEMPORARY MEASURES. Not every student political prisoner will be let out of their cells and even those who will be released by the regime, will remain under its close monitoring and will be returned, on most absurd grounds, as soon as possible.
Besides, those who know and worry about human rights in Iran want to see someone else to be released from Evin too. That person is: GANJI!

2005-09-28T19:04:00.000-07:00

Alireza Avaee has been appointed as the new head of Tehran judiciary department. He replaces the long serving mullah, Abbas Ali Alizadeh. It is said that Mortazavi, the notorious chief prosecutor will too be removed of his job soon. Changes are also taking place in the military positions.
Some have related these recent moves to the current nuclear crisis. It may well be so. However, it may also have to do with the upcoming visit by the UN rapporteur (which has not yet been officially confirmed, but the regime has been informed of its likelihood). The regime wants to get the torturers away from the scence. It is already in lots of trouble internationally and doesn't want to invite more.

Information or Imagination? Or Provocation?!

2005-09-21T18:37:00.000-07:00

The following is an extract from Kayhan today:

"While ever since the occupation of Iraq, there have been numerous signs indicating that terrorist operations targetting Iraqi people are organised and enforced by occupying forces, what happened last Tuesday has revealed everything and disclosed the true faces behind such barbaric crimes.

On Tuesday, Iraqi police at a check-point in Basra became suspicious of two British soldiers, who were wearing Al-Mahdi Army uniforms and carrying considerable amount of explosives. The British were arrested. The news of their arrest would not leave any doubt [among Iraqis] about the real identity of the terrorist acts and blast. People of Basra heard the news, their hearts still bleeding from the bereavement of those killed in terrorist attacks. They rushed towards the police station where two Britons were kept, demanding the Iraqi police that the two British terrorists appear on TV with their explosives and in their fake Al-Mahdi uniforms so that the truth behind the years of US-UK conspiracy against Iraqis and their role in terrorist attacks which have so far killed tens of thousands of Iraqi men and women becomes clear.Elsewhere, the HQ of the British troops in Basra, immediately after receiving the news of the arrest, dispatched two fully equipped brigades to the police station. They were armed with heavy weapons and tanks. [...] Once faced with the mob, the opened fire to them. [...]
One might argue that these two British soldiers were operating under cover to penetrate the Al-Mahdi Army. This is a ridiculous argument, as they did not have the slightest knowledge of Arabic. [...]. Besides their appearance (blonde hair and blue eyes) would raise suspicion in the naivest of the Iraqis, let alone the members of the Al-Mahdi who are professional fighters.
[Besides] how could they justify their carrying of explosives and remote transmission kit that are defined equipments used by terrorists? Would these men, as members of the British troops who have the whole area in their control, have any problem for carrying such things [as British soldiers] that would have justified their use of Al-Mahdi uniforms?
The above points demonstrate that the two Britons were in the course of conducting a terrorist operation and, as always, intended to attribute their act to Iraqis by leaving some indicators such as the Al-Mahdi uniform. [...]

The Marionette Returns Home

2005-09-18T20:53:00.000-07:00

Photo: ISNA (The message on the banner reads: "Greetings to the messengers of the [Islamic] Revolution".)

Ahmadinejad returns home to report back to his master that he has successfully taken Iran another step closer to UN sanctions. At Tehran's airport, a small crowd of Sepahis and their families were waiting to greet him. How they want to make Ahmadinejad a Mossadegh! In 1952, Mossadegh went to the UN to defend Iran's right against the British exploitation. He was seen as a symbol of resistance not only by Iranians, but also by other oppressed nations. However, the fact is that Mossadegh had not come to power by cheating. Nor did he have such a suspicisous background as Ahmadinejad does. His cabinet members were not terrorists and torturers either. And he was a 'politician', not a religious preacher.

Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN was just a recitation of ideas postulated by mullahs such as Messbah. Have a look at the latter's book on 'Mahdaviat' and you will find this by yourself. As a matter of fact, Ahmadinejads' speech had two parts: the first one which was on ideas of justice and Imam Zaman (Shia's Messiah) came from Messbah. The second part on nuclear energy was from Shariatmadari (head of Kayhan newspaper and Khamenei's close fellow).

Besides, Ahmadinejad did not meet with European heads of state. Why? Because, Larijani advised him not to do so as he was certain that Ahmadinejad was not capable of negotiating with such political figures as Blair and de Villepin.
Mossadegh was the messenger for Iranian nation at the UN, whereas Ahmadinejad was nothing but a messenger for the regime. He did his job very well.

2005-09-16T01:55:00.000-07:00

When I was a teenager, I had a friend called Shahram. He was a very nice and friendly boy. Everyone liked him. Wherever Shahram was, there was happiness. He would tell jokes, make fun of our neighbours to make us laugh. But his jokes were not like the types of jokes my other friends used to make.
When I left Iran, we somehow lost contact. I hadn't heard from him for a number of years until last week when I ran into one of our common friends. I asked him about Shahram. He said that I'd better not look for him anymore. 'He is not the same person he used to be', my friend said. When I insisted, he gave me his phone number. I was very happy that I eventually found Shahram. I called him. First he sounded very happy to hear me after such a long time. But as soon as I said to him that I wanted to see him, his tone changed. He tried to make excuses. But when I told him that I will not stay in Iran for long, he finally gave up and agreed that we meet somewhere.

We met in a cafe close to his place. My first impression was that he had changed a lot. He was not as cheerful as he used to be. In fact, he was not cheerful at all, although he said he was happy with his life. But I could notice that he was trying to hide something from me. I tried to extract that secret from him. He resisted, saying he was not willing to lose another friend. At last, he revealed the secret. He told me that he was gay and has suffered a lot because of this. His family had found about this and almost abandoned him. As he was saying these things, he fell into tears. Shahram said he had attempted suicide on a couple of occasions. I asked him whether he had considered leaving Iran. His responsed: "why should I leave the country I love, only because of my sexuality"? He also said that he had a boyfriend and neither of them would want to leave Iran. Shahram said he and his boyfriend had no problem in terms of hanging out in the city or travelling. That was no surprise to me though, given that in Iran it is much more difficult for heterosexuals to appear in public than for homosexuals. But what Shahram found unfair was that he could not live his life, express his emotions, etc. in the same way as others do. Then he asked me: "you are a lawyer, you tell me, why shouldn't we have equal rights as others do? [do other Iranians have rights?] Why should we be treated so differently? As if we are nothing else BUT pervert homosexuals?"

I know many like Shahram are suffering in Iran. Many are even forced to get married only to abandon their "pervert" behaviour. But I don't think Iranian society is prepared to approach homosexual rights now. Sexuality, both heterosexuality and homosexuality, is an absolute taboo. When husbands and wives cannot talk about their sexuality, and sexual need, when sexuality is completely absent from public (and private) attention, how can one expect a politician, an MP, a political figure venture into this? I don't know. All I could tell Shahram was that he and his boyfriend would have no future in Iran because the society is not yet ready to take them. Gay and lesbian rights are not a priority in Iran. There are 'more serious' issues than gay rights. Was I right? I'm not sure. All I know that Shahram, the cheerful teenager, has now turned into a depressed and anxious man.

2005-09-13T20:41:00.000-07:00

Today, Ahmadinejad left Tehran for New York on an official five-day visit to attend the 60th session of the UN General Assembly. According to reports, a number of Iranians are preparing to demonstrate outside the UN headquarters in protest to Ahmadinejad's presence (and other issues?). But what message will that send? Who is/are the organiser(s) of this protest? What is their real purpose? Could it be achieved in this way? Who will benefit from such a move? These are the questions that I wish I had clear answers for.

2005-09-10T02:55:00.000-07:00

It has been a month since Ahmadinejad, the least popular president of all times moved to the presidential palace in Pastor Street. He came to office by luring people with his idealistic promises that he certainly will not able to deliever. He is praying day and night for some heavenly help. So far, he has been lucky. God seems to be on his side. The price of oil is rising rapidly which has enabled him to accrue unexpcted amount of money and spend them at will. Only last week, his government allocated 100 million dollars from the ‘foreign currency savings account’ in subsidy for pupils enrollment in the new school year.
But the problems that his government is facing are far more serious and cannot be resolved by such temporary measures as injecting oil money. Widespead corruption, unemployment, deep division between the rich and the poor, crime, and lack of social justice are among the most significant problems in Iran. In addition, the divide between key figures within the regime is growing deeper. And this time, there is no attempt to disguise the divide. Karoubi, for example, has expressly referred to the critique of power as his intention for establishing his new political party. In a more recent time, he has also announced that he will not run for Khobregan Assembly (which is in charge of monitoring the leadership) next year. Elsewhere, the Expediency Council has turned into a scene of conflict: Ahmadinejad has not attended a single session of the Council since he has become the president. He obviously is not comfortable to be part of the Council which Rafsanjani heads. He has prayed to God that his master (Khamenei) show more empathy to him than what he has for Rafsanjani. It seems that God is on his side. (See Iran Scan).
In the meanwhile, political groups and parties are trying to find a way to curtail the absolute power of Ahmadinejad’s master. They have no doubt that with the current pattern of power, any attept towards reform or democracy is doomed to fail. But what kind of strategy will the come up with? No one knows yet. Besides, their passive political conduct during their heydays is still fresh in people’s memory. Thus, it is hard to conceive of their success in winning people’s heart in the near future. So, God seems to be on Ahmadinejad’s side on this too.
The US is loing its patient with the Islamic regime and wants to force it to stop its nuclear program. Economic sanctions are seen as the best viable solution. But, how will sanctions affect the Iranian regime? To answer this, we only need to recall the experience with UN sanctions on Iraq that were imposed after the 1991 Persian Gulf war. For over ten years Saddam’s Iraq was under sanctions. But did they serve their purpose? Did Saddam fall as a result of their imposition? The main bearers of the predicaments caused by the sanctions were Iraqi people, not the government who, hand in hand with UN officials, were making benefit of the emabargos! (And of course, this is no secret now). Imposing economic sanctions on Iran will be no different either. The regime, no doubt, knows where to find the resources it wants. And if the intention behind this plan is to weaken the position of the regime, it will certainly fail too. History suggests that Iranians become solidly united whenver they come under foreign pressure or encounter foreign hostility. Moreover, once under UN sanctions, the government can no longer be held liable for its inability to deliever its promises. It can readily point the finger to the US and the UN for causing all troubles in Iran. Besides, it would be likely that the government declare ‘emergency status’, under which it will be able to suppress, as it has done before, any political opposition. Will God be on Ahmadinejad’s side here too? This time its up to Americans to decide as to whether to bring God on Ahmadinejad’s side.

2005-09-08T21:03:00.000-07:00

A UN special rapporteur on human rights will soon (that is, in a few weeks time) be visiting Tehran . The main thing on his agenda will be meeting with Ganji and other political prisoners. I think the regime has now got enough time to decide whether it would prefer the rapporteur to meet with Ganji inside or outside prison (the rapporteur is intent on meeting with him and he will not accept excuses). Besides they should make up their minds as to what kind of impression they would want to deliever to the rapporteur by continuing to keep Abdolfatah Soltani in custody without charge.

From Commander Qalibaf to Mayor Qalibaf...(and to Presdient Qalibaf?)

2005-09-06T21:35:00.000-07:00

Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has been appointed as new mayor of Tehran. He gained the majority of Tehran City Council votes (8 to 7) to get the position. Qalibaf is Iran's fomer chief police commander, from which he resigned in last April to participate in the ninth presidential race. Although he was regarded as a top contender, he eventually ranked fourth in the race of eight rivals.

Some observers argue that Qalibaf's appointment as mayor has come as a result of an internal compromise between hard-liners and conservatives. He might have a good record in initiating reforms in the police form but has no credentials in civil management. Hardliners themselves are already divided in terms of their reactions to Qalibaf's election as mayor. While some tend to favour him for his background in Sepah and police force as well as loyalty to Khamenei, others seem not to have forgotten his attempts during elections to distance himself from the ultra hardliners and to depict himself as an advocate of -albeit moderate- social, economic, and political freedom.

Be it as it may, Qalibaf has got a marvellous opportunity to prove himself as a competent 'civilian' leader. No doubt that he has not given up his ambitions for becoming Iran's president one day. So will he use this new job as a ladder to the top job in the same way as Ahmadinejad did? Will Qalibaf be the next Iranian president?

2005-09-05T20:05:00.000-07:00

Latest on Katrina (Tue. morning Tehran time):

Mayor of New Orleans: the death toll of Hurricane Katrina may be thousands. (more)
EU countries are sending food and other supplies to the victims of Hurricane Katrina, after the US asked the EU and Nato for emergency help at the weekend. (more)
Iranian Red Crescent Society has voiced readiness to provide relief assistance to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States. (more)

2005-09-04T00:00:00.000-07:00

1) Thousands of people are believed to have died as a result of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in the US. A total human disaster. Many countries have offered aid to help with the relief effort. Among them are Sri Lanka, one of the poorest countries still suffering from the pains caused by tsunami, and Indonesia, another tsunami hit country. Even Cuba and Venezuela put aside their differences with the Bush administration to offer assistance. But what did the Iranian government have to offer? Zilch! Not even a word of condolence to the victims. And this is the government which claims that it wants to take the lead in 'globalising Islam'!
I recall when earthquake hit the Iranian city of Bam in December 2003, Bush was among the first leaders of the world to react by expressing his sympathy with the victims (the US also sent considerable aid to Iran). On another corner of the globe, John Howard, the Australian PM, in his new year message to Australian nation, said that the hearts and minds of Australians were with Iranians at the time hardship. But what did the "leader of Islamic civilisation" had to say to Americans as he appeared to preach on the festive day of Maba'ss (the day when Angel Gabriel was revealed to Mohammad)? Nothing but the same worn-out stories of hostility of enemies of Islam towards Iran.

So I wish to speak for all Iranians who are well-known for their kindness and caring attitude towards others: Our hearts are with victims of this massive and sad human tragedy. We have not forgotten Americans' generousity during the time of our nation's hardship (in Gilan and Ghazvin in 1990, in Bam in 2003) and we wished we would have been able to return the favour. Alas! We are not.

2) The US has refused to issue entry visa for Iranian parliamentary delegation to attend the World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments, which will be convened at the UN this month. This act is clearly against the norms of international law and in breach of US obligations. However, it would be interesting to see how many states would react to this decision by the US, considerin that since the appointment of Ahmadinejad as president, many countries have already restricted their diplomatic exchanges with Iran. And frankly, the conference would be better off without a delegation who got their position by cheating in the elections, wouldn't it?

2005-08-31T17:10:00.000-07:00

At the time of publishing this post, the bridge stampede deaths in Baghdad is reported at 852 by some sources and expected to climb. Condolences are all that I can offer to grieving Iraqis.

Conspiracy plot hatchers have come out quickly. The Age (Australia) reports: 'Iran today led a worldwide chorus of horror and outrage over the deaths of almost 1,000 people in a stampede as they headed to a Shi'ite shrine in Iraq, blaming "suspicious hands" bent on causing havoc in the country.
Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi expressed his country's "condolences and sympathy with the Iraqi people and government." Asefi said: "suspicious hands are involved in conspiracies to incite violence and bloodshed among the different Iraqi groups and tribes so that they disturb the security and calm of the Iraqi people. " '

Let's ignore such comments. At least, let Iraqi people grieve in peace.

2005-08-30T15:23:00.000-07:00

Ali Motahari, son of the prominent Islamic Republic ideologist Morteza Motahari, has suggested that the Iranian regime "must consider creating an Islamic Union of [Muslim] States". This idea of 'Islamic globalization' is frequently heard in Iran these days. As I stated in one of my previous posts, this was the slogan of the Islamic regime in the early days of its establishment. Its recent revival as an strategy is aimed at detracting Iranian people from the numerous domestic problems that the new government is seemingly unable to tackle.

Advocates of the idea of the union of Islamic nations seem to forget that the Isalmic Conference Organisation was established for precisely the same purpose but was relinquished much sooner than predicted for its inability to deliever its promises, and for its political bias and insensitiveness. Besides one important point that Motahari and those who support his theory of Islamic globalisation do not address in their theory is what role Iran would play in such a process, should it ever happen. Would Iran take the lead? Considering that Iran has made itself almost completely alienated in the Muslim world by its deeds, it is hard to conceive such a role for Iran. The majority of Muslim world, or at least the key nations such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf states, have already distanced themselves from Iran and its policies. Moreover, in a number of countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are ongoing attempts to show that Shia Iranians are not even real Muslims. For instance, there are losts of books that are being published, and electronic messages getting circulated to deliever that message.

Therefore, it seems that instead of spending its resources on futile projects such as Islamic globalisation, the priority for the Iranian regime must be to gain some decent reputation, domestically and internationaly, as a successful Islamic state.

2005-08-27T03:02:00.000-07:00

Mehdi Karoubi, former Majlis speaker, has formally established his new political party: E'temad-e Melli (National Trust). Addressing the would-be party members, Karoubi has highlighted the 'critique of power' as a major priority.

There is something exotic about this title. There was a time when everything bearing the term 'national' would be changed into ‘Islamic’. national consultancy assembly (Majlis) was changed into Islamic consultancy assembly and the national aviation company was re-named as Aviation of the Islamic Republic. But now, it seems, nationalist sentiment is increasing as a strategy to unify a fragmented society. A party whose majority is composed of former revolutionary and Islamists have chosen such a title as national trust. Thus, Karoubi wants to create trust. How? By offering opportunities for the 'critique of power', that is, by upsetting the pillars of the totalitarian authority. He acknowledges that the behaviour of the institutions of power is producing dangerous impact on people in terms of trusting their rulers. This kind of acknowledgment, however implicit, by a political party is unprecedented in Post(and pre) Revolution era.

Admittedly, it is too early to invest hope in Karoubi's party. It is still unclear how far it is willing to go in its critique of power and what dimensions and institutions of power it will address. Be it as it may, what has to be valued at this early stage is the very consciousness among influential figures such as Karoubi (and perhaps Rafsanjani) as to the danger caused by the growingly deep division between the centre of power and the Iranian populace.

2005-08-23T16:11:00.000-07:00

This regime is getting bolder and bolder. Yesterday, they hired a number of bullies to march in front of European embassies in Tehran "in protest against Europeans policies towards Iran's nuclear program". The mob burned the flags of France, Germany, and Britain. State News agencies, and newspapers (Kayhan, Jomhuri, etc.) claim that the protesters were 'students'. BUT THEY WERE NOT! They might have been pupils at regime's schools of violence and hatred, but they certainly were not students in the proper use of the term. They were Basijis from Ashura squad (Gordan-e Ashura). They get money to do these things. One day they are 'students', another day they are 'volunteer suicide bombers', the next day they are 'law enforcers', enforcing their law upon women who do not observe rules of their version of Islam.

Iranian students are not disrespectful to other nations, even when they become frustrated by acts of foreign nations or when they want to defend their rights against totalitarianism. The regime is fully conscious of the political sensitivity towards the Student Movement inside and outside Iran. Therefore, it wants to put its dirty hands on it and lay claim to it for its own evil purposes. Student associations must denounce such acts. I wonder why newspapers such as Shargh that used to be on students side are so disappointingly passive these days in terms of defending students against such accusations.

2005-08-22T16:49:00.000-07:00

Ahmadinejad’s cabinet is dubbed by his advocates as ‘revolutionary’. There is nothing scandalous about a revolutionary cabinet per se. It can succeed better than its predecessors. However, the danger that lurks out of this form of cabinet is the propaganda of the self-asserted intellectuals backing this cabinet and the credulity of those who are on the receiving end of the propaganda. Let’s not forget that in contemporary Iran, the revolutionary tendency has always been presented under the banner of Islam (the Shi’ee version of it, of course).

And what is so dangerous about this tendency? The danger is that religion, i.e. Islam, is used as a resource, as the only remedy, to deify the persons (like Khomeini, Khamenei and now Ahmadinejad) and to make sacred their ‘victories’ in a way that will always agree with the regime’s oppressive agenda. Consider the following from Ahmadinejad’s government charter:
“Imam Khomeini was such a [civilization-making] leader who, like Messiah, was able to rage a new spirit into the skeleton of the nation and revive the nation’s competence in civilization-making. He was a gift of God to the Iranian nation who could feel his devine breathe.” And among the ‘values’ that the new government enlists are: “to obtain God’s satisfaction through spreading justice and kindness and offering service to followers of God”.

In this way, the inherent evils of society are concealed under a heavy layer of moral/religious exhortation. Sadly, the oppositions inside the country are missing too easily this massive opportunity to make aware people of the dangers posed by the lies that are being spread by the new government.

2005-08-18T22:40:00.000-07:00

I am in Mashad, north east of Iran, on a short business trip. I had heard about Khatami's coming to Mashad for piligirmage (to pay respect to Shia's eighth Imam). So I decided to go and see him somehow. He was welcomed and cheered by a considerably big crowd gathered at Imam Reza's Mausoleum court. It was interesting to see how popular he still is among people although he is no longer their president.

He also delievered a speech which I found very inciting and revealing. He said: "enemies of Iran are not only those foreign enemies who do not want to see a progressive Iran. But there are also domestic enemies who are even more dangerous." Khatami added that the real enemies of Iran are those who want to promote a backward and outdated thought which stems from their reactionary views. Their views, Khatami said, "are anti-thought against conscience, and immoral". Khatami also warned against the move which wants to instutionalise old-fashioned and superficial beliefs and impose them on people". If you wish to get an idea about to whom Khatami was directing his attacking words, have a look at my last post below.

It looks like Khatami has eventually got his tongue back!

2005-08-17T21:39:00.000-07:00

Recently, Ahmadinejad government agenda has been published. I have been reading it over the past few days. It contains numerous intersting and thought-provoking points and I think it can be an important source to help us discern the political mindframe that this new government is going to represent.

What especially struck me about this agenda was its fascination with the establishment of a 'universal just government' as a 'macro-strategy', which implies a return to the early revolutionary slogans. At that time, and for some time after the Revolution, the idea of 'Hukumat-e Adl-e Ali' (a state based on Imam Ali justice system) was a popular slogan. A reflection of that can be found in Article 3 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic where the government is placed under the obligation "to support, by all means, the oppressed across the world".

Almost thirty years on, and now the ninth government of the Islamic regime founds its agenda on the same old slogan(s). What this backward move reveals is that the regime has admited its failure in delievering its promises. But it is not brave enough to abandon those empty idealist promises and engage with the real world. Even worse, to disguise its failure, the regime has come up with more lies. The only difference is that this time those lies are flavoured and wrapped by some more passionate, linguistically complex, sorcerous tone. Besides, has the Islamic regime not yet understood that it cannot and should not speak and make laws for the entire world? Isn't it disgraceful for a government to claim that it will bring justice to the whole world when its own citizens have been suffering from its injustices for such a long time?

2005-08-15T19:29:00.000-07:00

The so-called reformists have denounced Ahmadinejad's cabinet line-up. They argue that the new government is prone to become "docile to external powers" - by which they implicitly refer to the Leader and bodies under his control. Further, they argue that by picking up ministers who are not autonomous in their roles and thoughts but represent a homogeneous body, Ahmadinejad has failed his own motto during the election in which he had promised that his cabinet would represent diversity of interests and thoughts (the 70-million cabinet).

I wonder where these 'reformist think-tanks' were when Khatami was froming his cabinet in 2001 to advise him on the inclusion of diversity of interests? Moreover, at least Ahmadinejad's proposed list reflects that he is listening to his leader who brought him to power. But did Khatami listen to the millions of people who voted for him? His second cabinet was one of the weakest and least efficient cabinets in Islamic regime's history. Besides, he had no discernible agenda. Ahmadinejad, however, has a well-defined agenda - be it a dictated one or otherwise- and seems to know how to realise it. All of his moves can easily be read in line with that agenda. But Khatami only gave promises without knowing if they were realisable or he would have the capacity to deliever them. And obviously at that time, these think-tanks were too content with 'their victory' to think about an agenda. Suddenly, they have woken up to an ultra-hardliner government which seems to be intent on making life difficult for them. Too late, but at least they are awake to see where they failed.

2005-08-14T01:49:00.000-07:00

A few hours ago, Ahmadinejad submitted his list of ministers to the Majlis for vote of confidence (for further information on the names on the list click here).

Is this an 'ultra-hardliner' cabinet? Names such as Mohseni Ejehi (Ministry of Information [security]) and Saffar Harandi (Ministry of Culture) would make it hard to answer this question in negative. Mohseni Ejehi is particularly notorious for the role he played as the chief prosecutor of the Special Court for the Clergy in the imprisonment of Abdollah Nouri (Khatami's first minister of interior and an outspoken critic of Khamenei). Prior to that, in 1998, he was the trial judge of the court that convicted Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, Tehran's former mayor, on embezzelment charges - while it was believed Karbaschi was paying the price for supporting Khatami in 1997 presidential elections. Mohseni Ejehi is not an unknown figure among 'ettelaati's' [security officers]. He served in a variety of positions related to the Minsitry of Information in 1980's and 1990's. After leaving the Ministry, he remained a major player in coordinating security operations against dissidents through other security agencies (with their operation headquarters in Sepah and the Judiciary), called 'parallel security agencies'.

Saffar Harandi is another name on the list that sticks out like a sore thumb. He is a member of the editorial board of Kayhan the hardliner Tehran daily. He is a strong advocate of suppressing any opposition voice. So, the censorship office of the ministry of culture will become very busy once he takes office.

But how are the public reacting to this list? In fact, what surprises me is that people, generally, do not really seem to care about these developments. I asked a few people if they were in any way concerned about the names on Ahmadinejad's list, and they simply said no. People listen to the news passively. They are too preoccupied with making the ends meet to care about censorship or a Gestapo-like ministry of information.

2005-08-07T02:53:00.000-07:00

In his editorial today, Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan's boss, has argued that Iran is no longer a member to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In his very ludicrous argument, Shariatmadari refers to Article x(2) of the 1969 treaty which states:
"Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty".
In Shariatmadari's view, the decision made according to the above provison by the majority of the member states at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, according to which the NPT was extended for an indefinite duration without conditions, did not create any obligation for Iran, since, Shariatmadari writes, the decision did not go through the 'constitutional channels' for ratification. In other words, Shariatmadari has come up with a new doctrine in international law: when the duration of a multilateral treaty is extended by the decision of the majority of states (and the decision is to be enforced without condtions), for the decision to become legally binding, each and every member state must ratify it, since, Shariatmadari teaches us, the decision renders the already ratified and enforced treaty into an entirely new one! Obviously, his buddy, Mr. Firouz Aslani (a law don at Tehran university law school) has not taught him yet that there is a huge difference between extension of a treaty and its modification. Ultimately, he concludes that Iran has not been a member to the NPT since 1995 and as such its 'cooperation with the IAEA' must have stopped long time ago. He goes on to question the Iranian governments (under Rafsanjani and Khatami) as to why they had submitted to 'the illegitimate demands of the IAEA and the European threats'.

This is not the appropriate place to examine in detail the flaws of Shariatmadari's absurd argument, which simply reflects his lack of knowledge and competence in law and international law (something that I am sure does not surprise anyone). What is worth paying attention, however, is his persistence on urging Iran to pull out of the NPT and resume all uranium enrichment-related activities regardless of the demands of the IAEA (representing the demands of the international community). What objective are Shariatmadari and his fellows in Majlis and Sepah pursuing? What do they mean when they say the new government must give the Europeans a 'categorical and solid response' and teach them (and the US) 'a good lesson'? Jannati (the Guardian Council secretary general) said in Friday prayers last week that 'we' (i.e. him and his fellows in the Brethren) want to enforce our right (to develop the nuclear program) and we will pay the price for that". Would Jannati pay the price of a war? Or the Iranian people? But what benefits would Jannati and Shariatmadari and their likes' make out of another war? To find the answer to this question one only needs to look at how the deliberately prolonged Iran-Iraq war consolidated the pillars of the regime.

2005-08-03T17:51:00.000-07:00

Police say they are still investigating the assassination of Moghaddasi which took place last Tuesday in Tehran. While speculation is rampant and no police or security authority has yet directly linked the assassination to Ganji's case, Mobasheri, the chief of the Revolutionary Courts has told Kayhan that he does not see the two unrelated. Does this indicate a new project of oppressing dissidents is getting under way?

There is little doubt that Iran is coming to the verge of a deep domestic and international political (and social) crisis. There are reports of unrest in West and South East of the country. The political structure of the regime has changed dramatically after the recent election. Those who were previously deemed to be the insiders of the 'circle of trust' are now openly out of it. At the international level, the situation is getting worse for the regime. Its options are limited: either to surrender to foreign pressure and abandon its nuclear ambitions, or face the tough consequences that might put an end to their existence. The 'war committee' convened at the Ministy of Foreign Affairs yesterday is an indication for a grave concern.

On the other hand, the history of the Islamic regime shows that, at times of crisis, 'terror' has always been adopted as the best strategy to distract attention from the causes and centres of crisis, and, at the same time, to silence the opposition voices and international demands. A frightening fact about this strategy is that it draws no line that cannot be crossed. Saving the regime justifies every action. To give an example, in 1994, when the regime was under heavy international pressure for its human rights violations and terror aborad, and there were unrests taking place across the country, the regime's security strategists, then nested in the Ministry of Information, came to the conclustion that inciting terror and fear would be the best outlet for the crisis. The bomb explosion in the shrine of Imam Reza (Shia's eighth Imam)- the holiest place in Iran - was carried out under this strategy. Around fifty pilgrims were killed in that incident. Shortly afterwards, a "Mehdi Nahvi" was named as the prime suspect and after a few days it was in the news that Nahvi was shot dead in a shooting incident with the security officers in south of Tehran. There was no information as to who Nahvi was, what his probabale motivations were, or what background he had. But, the regime made the most out of this incident by reinforcing its oppressive measures domestically and gesturing for the international community that it is the main victim of terror and not the Iranian people persecuted by it inside and outside of the country.

It seems that the same strategy is gaining momentum once again. Reading hardliner newspapers such as Kayhan, Ressalat, and Jomhuri, one can easily draw similarities between the language used today and in the early to mid 1990s . Judge Moghadass (literally translated, his family name means sacred) was a 'holy man', a man of virtue, very religious, etc. But he was not holier than the Imam's shrine and his pilgrims. If his assassination would help saving the regime, it must be done - the strategy would say. Thus, my speculation is that soon we will hear of another poor fellow who either gets killed in a shoot out leaving behind letters in support of Ganji or some opposition groups, or gets arrested and then confesses to his empathy for Ganj's or some anti-regime cause. What will follow from that is not hard to predict.

More on yesterday assassination

2005-08-02T17:39:00.000-07:00

Kayhan's today headline reads: "The trial jude of Ganji's case assassinated". For now, I leave it to you to interpret this very telling headline, but I will write on it in my posting later today. Ah, one more thing, Ahmadinejad officially begins his new job as the Iranian president from today.

2005-08-02T15:34:00.000-07:00

Judge Ahmadi Moghaddas, Tehran's deputy chief prosecutor, has been assassinated (BBC report here). It is yet unknown who was behind this act, so one cannot rush to conclude that it was politically motivated. But whatever the motive, this assassination is sending a terrifying message: violence and terror is frighteningly growing as a means for 'settling accounts'. This can be the beginning of a chaos, a social disaster.

2005-07-31T00:20:00.000-07:00

While Ganji is hovering between life and death in Milad Hospital, his lawyer, Abdolfatah Soltani has been arrested by Mortazavi's (Tehran chief prosecutor) men (not by the police). Shahroudi (head of the judiciary) is reported as saying that Ganji's recent remarks, in which he stated his belief that "Khamenei must go", have made his case "legally difficult".
Shahroudi is right. Challenging Khamenei's power makes everyone's case difficult. All political prisioners in Iranian jails are there only because they questioned Khamenei's authority. They did not commit a crime, but apostacy. For the Brethren, there is a huge difference between committing a crime and committing apostacy. The former is dealt with by the courts and hence falls under the jurisdiction of Shahroudi. But sins are for Mortazavi to handle. Ganji is not a 'criminal', but an unforgiven apostate in the eyes of the Brethren. And those who defend an apostate share his sins. This is why Soltani was arrested without due process. He was 'outside' the law in the same way as Ganji and other political prisioners are.

It is very sad, but Ganji is destined do die. Death is his punishment for what he did to Khamenei. Khatami, Shahroudi, Rafsanjani can do nothing to save him - even if they sincerely want to.

2005-07-30T01:36:00.000-07:00

In 1953, the popular government of Dr.Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown by a coup led by the CIA and the MI6. General Zahedi was appointed as the prime minister. Mossadegh was arrested, jailed, and later placed under house-arrest for the rest of his life. All this was happening in front of the eyes of a ‘silenced’ Iranian nation. The very same nation who, only a year before the coup, had poured on to the streets in unity to show their solid support for their hero and leader.
Years passed. Mossadegh died. Obedient prime ministers were appointed. Shah was assured that people had forgotten all about Mossadegh and they now were in love with their Shah, the shadow of God on earth. Things were under control. What happened to Shah is history.

***

Last month, I was waiting outside a government building for the doors to open. A man and his son joined me in waiting. The boy wanted to sit on the stairs and asked his father to give him a piece of his newspaper to sit on. But as soon as the boy wanted to sit on that piece of paper, his father said: “Don’t sit on that paper! It has got the photo of the late Mossadegh on it. Use another one!”.
Today, at a newspaper agent, I found an elderly woman in tears. Her eyes were fixed on the headlines of a newspaper which read: “The Last Saturday of Khatami”. She was crying in silence. I don’t know if she was crying for Khatami or not. But I’m sure that many Iranians will remember Khatami, for all he did and what he falied to do for them and their country. It is his last Saturday. Ahmadinejad will be sworn in on Wednesday. The shadow of God feels assured of the nation’s bountiful love. ‘Things are under control’.

2005-07-27T16:38:00.000-07:00

"Partow Sokhan", a hardliner Iranian monthly, has published an advertisement for volunteers to carry out suicide bombings against "enemies of Islam". The monthly belongs to Ayatollah Messbah Yazdi an ultra-hardliner cleric. He is a thoerist for violent Islam and also a key supporter of Ahmadinejad.

Recruting suicide bombers (called volunteers for martyrdom), officially started in the late 2004, is becoming growingly appealing to some within the circle of power of the Islamic regime. It is claimed that 'thousands of volunteers' have registered since last year. This is despite the fact such a move has been categorically rejected by the majority of Iranians as 'un-Iranian', 'anti-Islamic', and 'in line with the strategies of al-Qaeda (whom are regarded even by the ruling clerics as the enemies of Shi'a and Islam).

What objectives would advertisements such as the one just mentioned satisfy? A major purpose of such moves, it seems , is to send a warning to the US that if they attack Iran, there are people ready to sacrifice their lives not only in the battlefield where the actual war would take place, but all around the world. Thus, Messbah and his followers including Ahmadinejad and even Khamenei himself believe that suicide bombers will be able to protect their regime and their Islam (it says in the ad that the purpose for those recruitements is to protect the foundation of the Islamic Republic and Islam - not Iran as a nation). The same justification is offered for the regime's insistence on acquiring nuclear power. But what the regime seems to disregard is that spreading the ideas of terror and violence will eventually lead to the end of its own existence. There are troubling reports of violence against the Iranian police and security forces from Khuzestan and Western Azarbaijan. Three policemen were killed during the unrests in the Kurdish areas near the Iran-Turkey border.

But is it surprising that those people who have for long been treated by the regime as second-class citizens because of their ethnic or religious background have now turned to violence as means to oppose the Islamic regime whose official strategy in dealing with every crisis has been to use violence and terror? Besides, the likes of Messbah may count on suicide bombers to protect them against 'foreign' threats. But what will they do to confront the domestic threats that are dividing the nation apart?

2005-07-25T23:44:00.000-07:00

Hello again!

This is my first update after a while. Not that there was nothing to write about during the past few weeks. In fact, there is always something happening in Iranian politics, so it is not hard to update one's blog even on daily basis. But I think there is a difference between a personal weblog and a news site or blog in that a weblogger shall update his or her blog only when he or she has really got something to comment on. It is not about spreading news, it is about sharing one's opinion. And an opinion worthy of being shared is not just out there. Rather one must be in the right mood to think and to share.

But it seems to me that some people just like to write about anything, to analyse everything, every situation, every action. Take this recent issue of Ganji's hunger strike for example. Every weblog that deals with Iranian politics (and in some cases even those not directly about politics) have something about Ganji: there are interviews, articles, comments, etc. And everyone sees him or herself competent to analyse Ganji's act, his motives, and the reaction by the Islamic regime. The funny (or perhaps sad) part is that some have gone too far to claim that the Islamic regime will benefit from Ganji's action, or the US is actually behind all this to see him dead and thus, it is argued, to find an excuse to attack Iran on the basis of the violation of human rights!!! Isn't it better to remain silent than to make such absurd comments? Isn't it better to say nothing when there is nothing to be said?

It is great to be able to update one's weblog often and in this way to share one's thoughts with viewers, it is great to have sound and solid views and share them with others. But it is totally irresponsible to abuse every possible situation only to show off. It is irresponsible and unethical to use the sufferings of responsible people like Ganji as a tool to get publicity.

2005-07-10T00:18:00.000-07:00

Yesterday, it was July the 9th. On this day in 1999, the first, but certainly not the last, popular movement, in the history of Islamic regime took place. It is known as the Student Uprsing of 18th Tir, which shook the foundations of the 'Mullahtarian' dictatorship in Iran. Students were attacked, killed, and wounded and many of their leaders were arrested. It was the end of the Republic for the Islamic regime, while at the same time, the beginning of the new era Mullahtarianism - whose offspring is the phenomenon of Ahmadinejad. July the 9th 1999 testified for the end of the so called 'Reformist' movement, when Khatami threatened the students to discontinue their uprising or get the stick.
I was present at one incident of clash between the students and Ansar which occured on Enghelab Avenue. It was Monday, July 12. Earlier in the morning Khamenei had addressed Ansar- his fanatic followers- to remain calm, even if protesters had torn of his photos. But in fact he was giving them the 'code': "Do not remain calm! tear them off!". I recall at 5pm, around a thousand people were marching down from east to west of Enghelab Avenue, chanting anti-regime and anti-Khamenei slogans. Then the Ansar came. Bearded men in white shirts, armed with thick sticks, chains, batons and tear gases. Some were on motorbikes. First they warned the people to go away, using offensive language. But demonstrators defied them. Then Ansar attacked, beating people with their sticks and chains. It was a dreadful scene. I still have in mind every moment of that day and all the days between the 18th and 23th of Tir. They remind me of a deeply divided Iranian nation: peacful vs violent, fanatics vs moderates. What I saw in those few days taught me of the huge diversity among the nation I belong to.
The 18th of Tir is remembered since. But every year in a different way. This year I had the opportuinty to be here on its anniversary. I wanted to see if people still remember those unforgettable days. Those who did were reluctant to express it openly. Maybe they asked what is the point in remembering those days when those who perpetuated the atrocities of 18th of Tir are now celebrating their 'victory'? What is the use of remembering the 18th of Tir when the 3rd of Tir (July 24 the day of the second round of the election) is celebrated by the aggressors of that day and the rulers of today, while all this is happening in front of our eyes, the nation's eyes - a nation who has been silenced and drugged to forget its real history as it happened?
There may be enough reasons to forget 18th of Tir. But there are many more reasons to believe, to have hope, to see, to learn, to teach, to celebrate, and to remember. The next '18th of Tir' will not be created by 'us' who went on the streets or used our vote in 1997 to make our voice heard, but by those who will talk to this deaf regime differently. Let the regime be happy for the moment that it has silenced the people. But it is only silence before the storm.

2005-07-04T08:25:00.000-07:00

I liked the way Mr. Ahmadinejad played down US accusations of his involvement in hostage taking in 1979. While Iranian foreign ministry reacted to the allegations, rejecting them as false and unfounded, Ahmadinejad did not make any comment on the issue: sorry, but just not interested!
Clearly and understandably, Americans are not happy about the election result. But they need some anger management here. They way they are reacting to the ‘problem’ just adds to it. First came the allegations, which sent the message to the American people, and the world, that Iranians have voted for a former hostage taker as their president. This was followed by the illegal move as a result of which the assets of a number of Iranian companies in the US were expropriated. These companies were allegedly linked with Iran's nuclear program. Regardeless of the credibility of the latest allegations, these moves show the depth of Americans' confusion over the developments in Iran. Americans seem to assume that under pressure, the Iranian regime will eventually give up its hardline stance. But the truth is that their strategy will only reinforce the fundamentalists’ position.
In fact, the recent moves by the US has damaged the reputation of the Iranian people (not the regime) and at the same time contributed to an increase in Ahmadinejad's popularity domestically. Accusing the man who will soon become the leader of a nation (regardless of the way he achieved this) of being an international criminal does no good to the reputation of a nation who are already facing a hard time convincing the world of their peace-loving nature. Besides, placing restrictions on the activities of Iranian companies in the US in less than a week after the election sends the message to Iranians that the US is not happy about your ‘choice’. More precisely, it shows that Americans are angry. For Iranians who hardly forget American historical hostility towards themselves, this translates into a victory. No wonder then, that these days, people who voted for Ahmadinejad's rivals in the past election are pondering on what makes the US taking such measures against Iranians when the Ahmadinejad has not yet officially sworn-in as the president They are now thinking perhaps those who were insisting that Ahmadinejad would be 'the best choice to ensure Iran’s autonomy' were right. All the hardship the US is giving us as punishment is only the result of saying NO to their wishes.
So what will come next? When will the US hostility towards us end? When will they let us deal with our affairs by ourselves? Does the US ever realize that its moves make it very difficult for the opposition groups inside Iran to criticise the regime as they will be accused of spreading US (the enemy) propaganda?

2005-07-01T20:46:00.000-07:00

Mr. Akbar Ganji, a dissident journalist, writer and politican activist who has spent over 62 months in the Islamic Republic prison for publishing his anti-regime opinions, has written a letter to the outside world to let everyone know if he dies in prison, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will be directly responsible for his death. Ganji who has been on hunger strike since last month says that "Hejazi" from the office of the Leader delievers Khamenei's orders to Mortazavi, Tehran's chief prosecutor, on how to treat Ganji should be treated.
I just wonder what has happened to us Iranians. Why don't we do anything for Ganji? What has happened to us? Isn't Ganji and his situation more important to us than a sport victory for which poured onto the streests to show, not only our joy, but also our power? Can't we use this power to support Ganji? Can't we just march on, I don't know, Enghelab avenue to show that we care about Ganji? Doesn't Ganji need our support? If it were not because of us, for our freedom, Ganji would not have been jailed. He put his life in danger, he sacrificed his freedom to open our eyes to the truth. This brave man revealed to us what was going on behind the curtains, he told us how the 'holy men' ordered our fellow Iranians to be butchered only because of their opinions. We have no hope in the international human rights bodies. They are useless. But can't we do something to at least show that we care about Ganji? Is this the way we treat freedom fighters?!

2005-06-30T23:01:00.000-07:00

Mr. Ahmadinejad has now become at the center of a row over his alleged involvement in the hostage-taking incident at US Embassy in Tehran in 1979. (See BBC report here.) It seems that a number of former 'hostages' have 'identified' Ahmadinejad as one of the hostage takers. But they are wrong. Ahmadinejad certainly looks very much alike one of the hostage takers (except that Ahmadinejad is noticeably shorter) but he was not involved in the incident.
The former hostage takers do not hide their past and are known to Iranians. They have occupied top positions in the government and the parliament. For example, Maesoomeh Ebtekar is currently serving as Khatami's deputy and head of the Organization for Protection of Environment. Ebrahim Assghar Zadeh (former member of Tehran Council) and Dr. Zafarghandi (Dean of Tehran Medical School) were hostage takers too. Mohsen Mirdamadi, another hostage taker, was a Majlis MP during the sixth session when the so called reformists were in majority. As one of the 'reformists', he was the head of Majlis Commission for Security and Foreign Policy too. Prior to that he had done a university degree in Britain. He has been contacted by the BBC on this matter and has dismissed the allegations over Ahmadinejad's role in the hostage-taking. So Americans need not worry, Ahmadinejad might have a terrorist background, but his victims were (and perhaps will be) Iranian nationals only.

2005-06-29T16:22:00.000-07:00

I am following the "Iran after the Elections" conference held in Brussels today (Wednesday). With all due respect to all of its participants, I must say they are, once again, wasting their (and their fellow Iranians') time.
Human rights in Iran is obviously a main theme of this conference. If I had got an invitation to this conference, the first question I would have asked myself would be whether the Europeans are really concerned about the human rights situation in Iran. There are few indications of its concern. One example is that the EU has maintained a 'dialogue' with Iran on Human Rights since 1990s, which, to a various degrees, has produced progress in some areas. For instance, the public floggings and executions which began to become common during the early years of Khatami's administration (to damage his international efforts) were stopped under EU pressure. So, 'human rights' in Iran is one of the issues of concern for the Europeans. But it is not the most important one.
In fact, Iran's nuclear program constitutes the most important area of concern for the Europeans. This is quite 'understandable': Iran's nuclear power is a matter of concern for international community since it poses threat to other states - mainly the US, Euoropean countries and of course Iran's immediate neighbours, while the human rights issue is a domestic (Iranian) issue. In other words, violations of Iran's breaches of human rights does not threaten the EU member states, or any other country, but its nuclear program does. Therefore, when it comes to priorotising their demands from the Iranian regime, they put the nuclear program first. This may appear quite reasonable. However, what should concern Iranian human rights activists is that Europeans may consider human rights as a 'concession' to the Iranian regime to persuade them not to continue on their nuclear program. The sad thing is, and we know it, that the European are prepared to give such a concession: to ask Iran to give up on its nuclear program to get lucrative trade agreements in return - with no mentinoning of the dark human rights record. Iranian regime, on the other hand, knows very well how to play its cards to get more and more concessions from the EU.
Another question that comes to mind is whether there was a single incident where the EU has delegated to a team of foreign ministers, like the one for nuclear talks, to put pressure on Iran for its violations of human rights. The answer is simple and clear: NO!
When I put these questions to myself I become less and less interested in the European prescription for Iranian democratic movement. Furthermore, only a look at the list of the participants in the "Iran after the Elections" conference convinces me that Europeans are not really interested in the human rights issue, otherwise why would they chose most, if not all, of the Iranian participants in this conference from those who have for long been 'disconnected' with the realities of today Iran. We do not need to go too far to realize this fact that there is huge gap between what is really taking place in Iran and the 'forzen' mindframe of some of those participants. A quick review of their pre-election comments drives this message home. The sad thing is, however, that their speeches at the conference reflects no change in their perspectives, and for the EU these are taken as the "Iranian views". Quite frankly, a few of those participants know nothing about Iran and its politics. They are there just to get attention. I am certain that for many Iranians it is a big misery to see those people, regardless of their high social or academic status, be taken as 'representatives or voices of Iran today'.
In any event, let's remain assured that the Iranian regime will not at all be bothered by what is said about its human rights record - in Brussels or elsewhere . They know how to play the game with the Europeans (and others) and are certain that such conferences and semiars, etc will do no harm to their powerful position.

2005-06-26T23:42:00.000-07:00

Khamenei to Ahmadinejad: Didn't I tell you that everything would be OK and "little Akbar" would get ditched? There you go.... Now let him cry for as long as he wants! Eventually we will have to ask "super nanny" to shut him up! But you don't need to worry, my dear Moody, OK? Good boy!

2005-06-25T16:28:00.000-07:00

Basijis took (or were taken) onto streets on Saturday afternoon to display their joy as well as power. Enghelab and Vali-asr streets was full of these men. They blocked the roads while chanting slogans against Khatami and Rafsanjani.There was also an implicit messages for women to remind them that from now on they will have to observe 'Islamic dress code rules'.
Vali-asr road enjoys a highly symbolic status in Tehran. It is the longest road in Tehran, connecting the north and nouth ends of the city. It is a beautiful road, famous for its old, tall, and thick trees, and of course for its shops. It has a rather political signifcance too. In early post-revolutionary days, it witnessed occasional clashes between Pasdaran (members of Sepah) and women whose dressing style did not, in Pasdaran's view, meet the Islamic rule. Vali-asr road has since retained its reputation of a locus for clash between modernity and (strict Islamic) traditions particularly between 'modern' women and 'fenatic' men. I recall when I was at high school, our 'religious teacher' used to complain about the ‘disgraceful’ road, by saying that "when one (i.e a man), walks on the Vali-asr road, his "tool for sin" would constantly go up and down!", which would make us assume that there was certainly something wrong with his, and many of his likes, "tool for sin".
It was perhaps for similar concerns that in 1990's ultra hardliners of Ansar convened a number of mass prayers in Vali-asr square to 'decontaminate' the street from the effects of the sins. Seemingly, a new era of decontamination has just begun. But this time it will not be limited to Vali-asr square. Nor will women be the only target for the hardliners. During the past eight years, the fundamentalists have been able to identify their friends from their enemies. They have a long list in hand and will go after them one by one. Throughout these years they were planning a war to take revenge. This should not surprise us. Ahmadinejad and his supporters are still living in the years of Iran-Iraq war. They still glorify war and killing. To realise this, one only needs to have a look at Ahmadinejad’s website and his speeches during his campaign. There are frequent references to jihad, conflict, war, gun, and of course martyrdom. His supporters are refer to Ahmadinejad’s recent alleged victory as the ‘conquest’ (Ghalabeh). And of course they are deeply wrong. Iranians, particularly young generation Iranians, are not living in the spirit of war. No doubt that Iranians love their country and will still embrace martyrdom to save their country against foreign threats. But they are not in war with each other. They do not see one another as enemies in the same manner as Ahmadinejad and his supporters want them to do. So, if Ahmadinejad wants to emabrk on his jihad, there will be more than one Vali-asr road in Iran where he will have to fight

"Election": a few things to remember

2005-06-24T23:40:00.000-07:00

First and foremost I should say that from now on when I use the term "election" I do not mean that I believe that there was in fact an "election". This was not an election, even in the Islamic regime's own terminology which had been acted upon in previous elections. It was a sham, a fradulent process. I have enough evidence to believe, and of course to prove, that Iranian men and women were deveived into taking part into a show whose actors were chosen and its screen play was written long time ago. You will certainly ask me whehter I was blind yesterday and did not see the massive public turn-out. No I am not blind. I was there. I saw 'the mass' both on the 17th and the 24th. But the issue is that their votes were not counted. Karoubi and Moeen were ahead of Ahmadinejad in the first round but they were kicked out of the contest. And yesterday again, ballots were left uncounted. Because everything was pre-arranged. The Minstry of Interior had already been ordered to announce Ahmadinejad as winner. Kayhan newspaper knew last night that Ahmadinejad would be the regime's president. Its headline was set last night (before the ballots were even taken to the Minstry) and would read: "Ahmadinejad, the nation's president" and "the nation finished the job". But then it was not allowed to get published just in case it would provoke further suspicion as to the result. Also, before the official results get published, Khamenei had urged Ahmadinejad's supporters not to take on the streets, becasue "it was against the interest of the nation". In other words, the Leader warned against acts that might have caused clashes that could go out of control. It seems that the Leader himself is aware of how popular his president is.
In any event, the regime only needed the massive turn out to legitimize its position in the doubtful eyes of the public and of course the international community. And it successfully achieved what it wanted to achieve. I feel sorry for those who still believe that this was a lawful election and are wasting their time analyzing its outcome! If you read my previous posts, you will realize that I was against the much supported boycott strategy long before the election. I had argued, several times, that this election would be a very good chance for continuing on the way towards more democracy. But this was before I came to Iran. This was before I got the information on fradulent activities, and the ballot riggings.
However, despite what happened, I believe this is still the best chance to open our eyes to a number of facts. At the outset, a crucial issue is to identify those who betrayed the democratic movement along the way. Who were those who did not have the guts to stand against the tyrant? Who were those who did not have the courage to defend the people's right against the will of the greedy dictator who justifies all his actions in the name of "the interest of Islam"? I do not think it is very a hard task to find them. They are recognisable from their silence. From their cowardness. And among them is the man who was once our hero. We, Iranian youngsters, vested in him our hopes with all of our hearts. Instead what he gave us in exchange was baseless excuses, lies, and eventually, he betrayed us only to maintain his position as a loyal servant to the supreme dictator.
What would, then, we learn from this? We would, I hope, begin to draw some lessons as to our choice of heros and leaders in the future. We would acknowledge that we were disillusioned throughout this time by empty promises and lies. We were disillusioned because we had believed that this regime had room for change, for democracy. We were disillusioned because we could never imagine that the Islamic Republic would go to the extreme to meddle in people's votes, which violates both of the Islamic and Republic foundations of this regime. But the recent events clearly displayed that this regime sees no restraint on its power. It has no respect for people. Even if Rafsanjani had won this election, this argument would still hold. Thus, a major lesson to be drawn from this 'election' is to acknowledge that this regime has no room for democracy and the rule of law.
Now that Ahmadinejad is in power, it is the fundamentalists' turn to celebrate their 'vicotry' and see in him a hero who has come to rescue them from the 'oppressors' (Mustakberin). So, they are already disillusioned. An ideology which attempts to divide the people of one unified nation into the oppressed and oppressor is certainly destined to lose. Besides, Ahmadinejad may carry the title of the 'president', but he is the most powerless man in Iran. There is a long list of individuals and groups to whom he is indebted for his coming to the office: from the leader, Sepahis and Basijis, to the hardliner Mullah's in Qom and elsewhere, and those who funded his campaign. He will certainly have a hard time satisfy all of them. Moreover, anyone who has little knowledge about Iranian politics would know that Rafsanjani is not the type of person who would simply go away to learn to live with the fact he was lead astray by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani knows how to return the fist.
I said all the above to come to this conclusion: for those who wish a new Iran without the Islamic Republic, Ahmadinejad is a gift. His troubles should be turned into opportunities for opposition groups. They must rethink and rearrange but not for the next election, rather for a totally new government. But will this opportunity be taken?

Mission accomplished: Hezbollah has won with the help of the hidden hand of Allah!

2005-06-24T19:40:00.000-07:00

As anticipated Ahmadinejad is now officially announced as the Islamic Republic's new president. Mission accomplished! Congratulations to those who voted for him! They must be delighted that their favourite cadidate was their Leader's favourite too. Ahmadinejad is the first appointed president of the Islamic Republic. And perhaps the last one? Who knows?!

2005-06-23T22:06:00.000-07:00

9.30 am. Tehran time:
The run-off has got underway. The turn-out is significantly higher than the first round. One can particularly notice the higher number of women who have come out to vote. I am heading to the south of Tehran where it is said Ahmadinejad has more support. That is all I can say for now.
By the way, at this time it is very difficult to get connected to the web (via this crappy dial-up system!). So I might not be able to update this page as often. Apologies in advance.

2005-06-22T17:00:00.000-07:00

Translation of my previous post in Persian:

I have information that on Friday, after the end of the election, many ballots were not taken to the Ministry of Interior for counting, and many of those that were already taken there, were not counted. In the midnight of Saturday (June, 28) an order was received by the Ministry of Interior from the Office of the Supreme leader, which requested that the result of the election be released as (1-Rafsanjani, 2-Ahmadinejad). Subsequently, the Director General of the Elections Office of the Ministry of Interior contacted the Minister and the latter called Mr. Khatami, who urged that the counting must go on according to the law. Early in the morning, Khatami went to the Ministry of Interior to supervise the counting process in person. The first official results announced by the Ministry of Interior placed Karoubi on top, ahead of Rafsanjani and Ghalibaf. However, the Guardian Council, who did not expect the Ministry to disobey the Leader's wish, announced its own result in which Rafsanjani was on the top, followed by Ahmadinejad. As the discrepancy emerged, the same person called the Ministry again, this time using a threatening language, to deliever the message that if the Minister would not give in to the order, dangerous consequences would face Iranian nation, and the families of the Minister and even the President. Khatami was contacted again. He returned to the Ministry, and after discussing the issue with Mr. Lari (the Minister of Interior) they decided to act as per the Leader's order.
It is also said that some among the fundamentalist camp had the view that Ahmadinejad must be announced as the absolute winner in the first round. However, for yet unknown reasons, this view was not acted upon.
Currently, the fundamentalist hardliners are certain that Ahmadinejad will be announced as the winner in the run-off on Friday. Basijis are on alert to take necessary action in case of any unrest. The Iranian police are aware of this plan and it is said that the meeting between Ghalibaf and Rafsanjani a couple of nights ago revolved around this issue. A 'legal coup' is underway. Rafsanjani is well aware of this course of events and is trying to prevent the coup to happen. But he is also aware that he himself is not safe.

2005-06-22T05:12:00.000-07:00

به من گفته شده كه بسياري از صندوق هاي آراء در روز جمعه به وزارت كشور منتقل نشده و بسياري از آنهايي هم كه در اختيار وزارت كشور بوده شمارش نشده اند. در نيمه شب شنبه دستوري به وزارت كشور از طرف رهبري ابلاغ مي شود كه در آن آمده بود كه نتيجه آراء را به اين صورت اعلام گردد (1-هاشمي 2-احمدي نژاد) مدير كل انتخابات وزارت كشور با وزير و ايشان با خاتمي تماس مي گيرد. نظر خاتمي اين بوده كه شمارش آراء مطابق قانون انجام شود. صبح خاتمي شخصا براي نظارت بر شمارش به وزارت كشور مي رود. نتايج اوليه را وزارت كشور به ترتيبي اعلام مي كند كه كروبي در صدر بوده است. در حالي كه پيش از آن شوراي نگهبان به تصور اين كه وزارت كشور از دستور رهبر تخطي نخواهد كرد ترتيب مورد نظر وي را منتشر كرده بود. پس از آگاهي از سرپيچي وزارت كشور همان فرد مجددا با خاتمي و وزير كشور تماس مي گيرد و هر دو را تهديد مي كند كه در صورت ناديده گرفتن اوامر رهبري وقايع تلخي براي مردم و براي خانواده هاي خاتمي و لاري رخ خواهد داد. خاتمي مجددا بوزارت كشور مي رود و پس از گفتگو با لاري به اين توافق مي رسند كه به امر رهبري گردن نهند. ضمنا در ابتدا نظر بر اين بوده كه هاشمي هم حذف و احمدي نژاد برنده قطعي اعلام گردد. اما در نهايت به دليلي كه بر من معلوم نشده اين نظر رد مي شود. در حال حاضر نيز اين اطمينان داده شده كه در روز جمعه احمدي نژاد بعنوان پيروز انتخابات اعلام مي گردد. به تمامي نيروهاي بسيج نيز آماده باش داد شده كه در صورت بروز آشوب با آن مقابله نمايند. نيروي انتظامي هم از اين برنامه مطلع است و دليل ملاقات دو شب پيش قاليباف با رفسنجاني نيز همين بوده و نه حمايت او از هاشمي. كودتا در حال پيشروي است. حتا گفته مي شود كه زمان تنفيذ رياست جمهوري نيز بسيار زودتر از روال قانوني معمول خواهد بود. رفسنجاني در تكاپوست تا كودتا را خنثا كند اما مي داند كه به خود او هم رحم نخواهد شد

2005-06-21T16:46:00.000-07:00

Iran will not be the same after June 24, regardless of who will come out victorious from the run-off on Friday. If we agree that the hardliners have been planning how to win this election since 1997, then we must agree they have also been planning how to lose it. These days there are widespread rumours that if Rafsanjani happens to win the election, a coup by pro-Ahmadi Nejad (or in fact pro-Khameneni) factions within Sepah and Basij will be imminent. I wrote about this possibility before (see my post on June 12). But would Khamenei be so witless to give in or exhort such a coup at this time of crisis when Iran is closely monitored by international community, and particularly the US who is impatiently looking for an excuse (more convincing than the worn out WMD one) to invade Iran? We know, of course, that since its establishment, the Islamic Republic has always paid minimal attention to pressures from outside or to judgements as to its legitimacy, but the situation is totally different this time. Previously, the regime could argue for its legitimacy relying on its own people support. And the international community had to submit to this argument. I was present at a conference on the Middle East in 2004, where a panelist, in answering a question on the possibility of a Coalition invasion of Iran, said "we cannot attack a sovereign state on any grounds when the president of that state was elected with more than 20 million of free votes". Thus, the public support for Khatami acted as the most important deterrent to a possible invasion. His popularity was a significant unifying factor within the society as well. An imposed government, on the other hand, will undermine the legitimacy of the regime both inside and outside the country.
Bringing Ahmadi Nejad into power, be it through a shambolic election or a coup, will certainly raise Khamenei to the peak of his power, while hugely damaging the already fading legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. And history tells us that all dictators were bogged down at the peak of their power. Is Khamenei be so naive to gamble legitimacy for power? Recent development suggest the answer to this question is positive and thus Iran will not be the same next week. It may be the final day for the so called reform that began in 1997, but it will be the first day of a wholly new era.

2005-06-20T17:06:00.000-07:00

From what I see, I believe Rafsanjani has little chance of winning the second round of the election on Friday - unless a miracle happens. Ahmadi Nejad camp is much more active these days. Especially in remote towns and villages. But this does not mean all of his votes will come from those areas. He generally has support among people who do not trust Rafsanjani and his policies. Thus, many of those who will vote for Ahmadi Nejad, will do so not because they are in love with him, but because they simply hate Rafsanjani. And this is how Iranian "who's who" will look like from next week:

Leader: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
President: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Head of Judiciary: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Parliament speaker: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Head of the National Radio & TV: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
...: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

2005-06-19T21:57:00.000-07:00

I have received reports from a number of towns that Basij (Sepah's militia) are active there trying to encourage people to vote for Ahmadi Nejad on Friday. This is done in a variety of ways including offering poeple money and clothes and provoking their "sense of dignity". These reports come from these Iranian towns: Klardasht, Lahijan, Asataneh, Birjand, Neyshabour, Garmsar, Varamin, and Zanjan. In one case, I am told, that Basijis personally approach peoples' houses, asking for the 'man/elder of the household' to come to talk to them. Then, they go on to give advise to the men that if they feel responsible for their family members, especially their women (Namouss) they must vote for Ahmadi Nejad, who will, they claim, protect their honour.
It now seems that Basijis have been perfectly organized and directed from since well prior to the election. The leaders of this organized move are said to be among the top ranking military officials, including General (Basjij) Firouz Abadi (head of the Iranian amred forces and the closest military man to Khamenei) , and General (Basiji) Alireza Afshar and Mehdi Chamran (former deputy to Firouz Abadi and the current head of Tehran council). Also, in another front, there are reports of Imams in mosques preaching the prayers as to the importance 'Islamic task' of voting for Ahmadi Nejad.

Karoubi - who lost in the first round - revealed that he had asked the Ministry of Interior on Friday not to extend the election time for more than two hours. But he was told that the Ministry was "under pressure" to extend the time until 11pm (which it did). It is said that a top ranking military officer had contacted both Khatami and Lari (minister of Interior), advising them not to "stand on the way of the will of the Supreme Leader" on this issue.

Election, selection, etc.!

2005-06-18T16:04:00.000-07:00

The final ‘official results’ are out now. However, the official rate of participation in the election still seems dubious. I travelled around Tehran and was in touch with people in a number of towns across the country. I have spoken to people after the elecion about their experience.All this suggest a turn-out remarkably lower than what the regime claims. Also there are doubts as to the order of the rate of votes polled for each candidate. I still wonder how Kayhan newspaper could be so certain at 7 o’clock on yesterday morning that Rafsanjani and Ahmadi Nejad were already through?!! How could Kayhan be so certain three days before the election that 30 million people would turn out to vote (and this is exactly what the official number now indicates)! Kayhan must be either somehow in touch with the 12th Imam or? In any event, official results are all we have available.
Rafsanjani and Ahmadi Nejad are reportedly through to the second round, each with around 15 per cent of the total votes. Reading some of the comments on the election, one can see that for many Ahmadi Nejad’s achievement is quite shocking. But I do not see anything shocking about this. One needs to take into account the number of Basijis across the country, their families, and those who have voted under the influence of Basijis. Plus, his gestures as being humble and popular turned out to be very efficient, given the nature of Iranian society and the emotional psyche of many. Still, Ahmadi Nejad has only won less than 15 per cent of the entire votes. Thus, those who are claiming that ‘Iran’ has voted for him, and therefore scolding Iranians for their ‘wrong’ decision, need to reconsider their suggestion. And let’s not forget that, as we know, this is how election system works.
Besides, Ahmadi Nejad could not easily got through to the second round without the help of other candidaes. He is through because so many got disillusioned by Karoubi’s 500,000 Rls a month promise. And because still there are people who believe Rafsanjani can make a good president. And, more importantly, Ahmadi Nejad went through because Moeen and his supporters forgot that the election was going to take place in Iran, not in Ukraine, or Georgia, or France. Let’s not underestimate the help of Iranian commentators abroad. Ahmadi Nejad will be with us until next week to remind those ‘commentators’ in exile, who made the boycott recipe for Iranians, that they must either consider a hobby other than mingling Western ideologies with Iranian affairs or update their ‘Iranology’ software.
The election was also a good lesson for many, including myself, that scientific methods of predicition and evaluation do not work in the same way as they do in other countries.
In any event, the first round is past and the second round is fast approaching. It is going to be a very tough challenge for Iranians. I wanted to say they now need to decide according to the old maxim: “the evil you know is better than the evil you don’t”. But then I remembered that they must have known the evils by now. So I guess it is going to be decided according to “the better of the two evils” rule.

Update (6) 2.20pm

2005-06-18T02:53:00.000-07:00

Official reports: 1-Rafsanjani 2- Karoubi 3- Ahmadi Nejad.
Ahmadi Nejad's headquarter claims that this latest results do not include votes polled in Tehran. They believe Ahmadi Nejad will top, once Tehranis votes are also counted in the final result. Let's wait and see.

Update (5) 2pm

2005-06-18T02:37:00.000-07:00

Ahmadi Nejad has now jumped to the first place, above Rafsanjani and Karoubi respectively (this is according to unofficial reports though).

Update (4) -Saturday 1pm Tehran time

2005-06-18T01:07:00.000-07:00

Iranian state news agencies and Kayhan claim that more than 30 million people have casted their votes. I do not want to dismiss this claim readily but I believe that it must be dealt with extreme caution. Let's not forget that the regime wanted to use this election to display its popularity. And Khatami and his Ministry of Interior are part of this regime. They would do anything to save a reputation for the regime even if it takes lying to their own people. There is no doubt that those who had advocated a boycott on this election, have been stunned and disappointed by yesterday turn-out. However, from what I have seen in Tehran and the news I have got from people elsewhere, it can be said that yesterday turn out was much lower than the the 1997 election, and thus the real number seems to be much lower than the alleged 30 million.
Ahmadi Nejad is reportedly among the top three at present. If people have chosen him as their favourite president, no one has the right to dispute why they have done so, although it would be necessary to investigate why people had shifted from a man like Khatami to someone like Ahmadi Nejad - with the kind of background and personality that he has and we all know about it. However, there are reports that in some poll stations, Sepah and its mitilias (Basijis) overtly interfered in the voting process by writing Ahmadi Nejad's name for those who were unable to write or those who were still undecided as to whose name they were going to put in their vote. Obviously one of the contenders - Karoubi - has been informed of this intereference and will hold a press conference soon to give more details on it.
Furthermore, this was Kayahan's headline this morning: "Rafsanjani in the first rank, Ahmadi Nejad second". How on earth could Kayhan know that Ahmadi Nejad was second at 7 o'clock in the morning (the time when it gets published and distributed), while first official results were only announced at 8am? Besides, Ahmadi Nejad has not yet come up higher than the third (not the second) place. So it is not known where Kayhan had got its 'results' from. Also, one unprecedented thing that has happened is that the Guardian Council is now announcing its own version of results!!!, whereas the law says the Ministry of Interior is the sole body in charge of announcing election result. What a mess! That's all that I can say for now.

Update (3)

2005-06-17T20:47:00.000-07:00

According to Iranian news agencies, Karoubi, Rafsanjani and Ahmadi Nejad are ahead of others as the votes are being counted. However, the ballots in major cities (including Tehran, Tabriz and Mashad) have not been counted yet. So this order can change any time soon. The final result will be announced by tonight (Saturday night). Also it is now certain that the election will be dragged into the second round which will take place next Friday.

One another thing: I was very close to spend the rest of my visit to Iran in jail. Yesterday evening as I was taking photo of a poll station, I was 'arrested' by the police! I could never imagine that taking photo of people in a public place was a crime! In any event, I spent a couple of hours at a police station but then got released. Afterall, being a lawyer, I knew how to deal with that kind of situation. But it was a frustrating experience I must say.

I will have more updates and analysis soon.

Election update (2)

2005-06-17T06:30:00.000-07:00

I visited a few poll stations in Western and Northern Tehran too. Those in the north were very quiet. In fact, I waited outside one of them around Tajrish sq for almost an hour but no one turned up to vote. Not a soul! I hat saw a few people in some others as I was passing by. However, there was a line outside a mosque in Western part of the city (in Sattar Khan street). This was around 2pm. I drove further up to Shahrak Jandarmeri and Marzdaran. Most of the stations on my way were rarther quiet with no more than 10 to 20 people turning up every half an hour or so. I wonder what is happening in the south. I might go and check if I can.

There are rumours that bombs have been planted near some of the poll stations as well. Some people, I have so heard, have preferred to stay in for the fear of explosions. However, so far there has been no report of trouble.

Election update

2005-06-16T23:34:00.000-07:00

It is 10.30 am, Tehran time. I just came back from a short trip around my place in downtown Tehran. I visited a number of poll stations: one around Vali-Asr square which was fairly busy. Another one in Felestin Street (Kakh) was rather quiet, I was there for almost 30 minutes, but I saw only 6 people turned up to vote! But it is Friday anyway, and many people sleep in. So I think stations will get busier in the afternoon. I have photos as well but cannot upload them now, because this dial-up is a really big problem here. I am heading to the West of Tehran to see what is happening there.

My vote

2005-06-16T23:01:00.000-07:00

As you might have noticed, unlike many Iranian bloggers, I have not mentioned in here whom I will be going to vote for. I do not think it really matters at all. Who will care about my choice anyway? And really, who cares about what other bloggers say about their favourite cadidate? If someone wants to go and cast a vote they already have made up their mind. And if they do not want to vote, which for me is itself a way of casting vote in sense of expressing ones' decision, Windsteed is in no position to change their decision. Besides I am not after too much publicity in the same way as many other Iranian bloggers are - not that it is a bad thing, I just do not like it. I write out of passion, for those who want to get a 'different' perspective. That's all.

Viva Iran and God bless Iran! This is my vote.

Update

2005-06-16T00:57:00.000-07:00

Well, as it stands, it is unlikely that the new Iranian president will be determined in the first round. But if that turns out to be the case, then who is likely to make it to the second round? It is a very though call. Until two days ago Rafsanjani was ahead of other contenders. However, 'unofficial' reports and polls suggest that other candidates have now come up by a number of points. Thus, Rafsanjani has no longer an absolute lead. Moeen, Larijani, and Ghalibaf all have hopes to make it to the second round. But will Karoubi, Mehralizadeh, or Ahmadi Nejad be able to pull off a victory in the first round too? They might have support among certain groups of people, which would have been remarkable if they were running for parliamentary elections. However, to win in a presidential election, they need much broader support than what they already have. Besides, another factor which makes it very hard to predict the election at this stage is the public turn out at the ballots. At the moment, it is estimated that between 45 to 55 percent of people will turn out to cast their votes. This rate is, of course, variable across the country. In Tehran, for instance, it drops down to somewhere between 15 to 25 per cent. But this also can change as we get closer to the election time.

In the meanwhile, Ayatollah Khamenei has addressed the people, 'inviting' them to participate in the election - which he called a 'divine affair'. Not surprisingly, he, once again, predicted that "on Friday, the Iranian nation will vote for the Islamic republic Constitution, and the unchangeable principles of the Constituion, as well as the Islamic values." No doubt that one of the "unchangeable principles" he had in mind was the one regarding his own position, nameley, the principle of "Velayat Faghigh" (loosely translated, the guardianship of a muslim leader). I read his words as suggesting that 'whomever the people vote for on Friday, they will be voting for me'. You might disagree with me by saying that he actually said that people would vote for the Constitution. But please read the statement again. It is not just tautology that he mentioned the "unchangeable principles" of the Constitution. There is an intention behind those words. Khamenei is in fact sending a clear message to those - i.e Moeen and his supporters - who have promised that they would prepare the context for a referendum or a law to limit or abolish Velayat Faghih and his (absolute) powers. Accordingly, he is warning that even if Moeen becomes the next president, he will have to understand that it was not him who people had voted for. Rather it will be Khamenei and the regime - as it is. And Khamenei means what he is saying. He meant it last time when Khatami won over 20 million votes to become presdient. He is not joking this time either. But will the next president of nation be up for the challenge to make it clear to Khamenei that the mechanism through which people vote for the constituion, and the principle of Velayat Faghigh, is called referendum and not presidential elecion?!

Rezaee out, Ahmadi Nejad in

2005-06-15T16:06:00.000-07:00

With almost twenty four hours until the ballots open, Rezaee is out (as predicted) and the number is down to seven (although he has not yet officially reported his withdrawal to the Ministry of Interior). Rezaee has been reported as saying that he pulled out under no pressure. But he was under pressure for a long time since before he officially registered his candidature. However, he had resisted to pressures throughout, as one of his motives was to prove to the Leader, who fired him from the office of the commander in chief of Sepah after his son had sought asylum in the US a few years ago, that he still enjoys some popularity among Sepahis. A few days ago, a number of Sepahi Generals issued a statement supporting Rezaee, whom, the statement said, was a symbol of the good memories of victories during the Iran-Iraq war. Now it seems that Rezaee regarded the statement sufficient to prove his point.
People from the Council for Coeperating the Revolutionary Forces (CCRF), a hardliner body, recently increased their pressure on both Rezaee and Ahmadi Nejad to convince them that it would be against the interest of the hardliners to have four candidates in the election, particularly with the 'risk' of Rafsanjani's victory just around the corner. Obviously, Rezaee was less stubborn than Ahmadi Nejad. It is said that one of the members of the CCRF (probably Bahonar) addressed Ahamdi Nejad in anger and frustration after he failed to respond to CCRF demand to withdraw, accusing him (Ahmadi Nejad) of striving for power not service to people (referring to Ahmadi Nejad's motto that his only intention is to be of service to people).

I will have more on the latest developments in my next post.

2005-06-14T17:17:00.000-07:00

Kayhan, June 13, 2005 (the day after the bombings in Ahwaz). The headline above the photo reads: Khuzestan joyful over the victory of Foolad

More on recent blasts

2005-06-14T16:35:00.000-07:00

It is good to hear that one of the candidates - Moeen- has disputed the 'foreign element' in the recent blasts in Tehran and Ahwaz. He is reported as saying:"recent bombings are suspicious and their roots must be discovered", warning that there are "pressure groups" who want to "change the election results". I have said before that the extremist factions in the hardliners' camp are highly concerned about Rafsanjani or Moeen winning the election. They are attempting to stop the election. If they fail at this stage, which so far seems very likely to be the case, they have plans for after the election. What causes worry is that their plans are backed by top-ranking officials. I hesitate to say this, but I am somehow inclined to conclude that the Supreme Leader himself will not stop those plans from going ahead, even if he would not formally endorse them. What directs me towards this conclusion is that he did not officially condemn the bombings or send a message of condolence - somehing that he almost always does after disasterous incidence like these. This might not be a good 'reason' to believe Khamenei has a role in the recent events, but I do not want to argue that he has a role. Rather I want to suggest that he is aware of those plans and prefers to remain silent. Interestingly, on the day after the explosions, Kayhan, Tehran daily which is under Khamenei's contorl dedicated its second main headline (see the picture above) to the victory of Foolad (an Ahwazi soccer team) in the Iranian league, while Ahwazis were mourning for their beloved ones. Remember that this is the newspaper that wanted days of mourning to be announced for the "half-naked" Armeninans dancing in Ahwaz a few months ago. Now human lives are lost but no one seems to be even interested in mourning, let alone investigating to find out who was behind those murderous acts. Does this not at least indicate that there are powerful hands behind this incidence and Iranian officials, law enforcement agencies, and security are aware of it?

Rafsanjani: a gifted psychoanalyst

2005-06-13T17:34:00.000-07:00

With only three days left, it is almost certain that Hashemi Rafsanjani will win the election - although there has been a steady rise in the rate of Moeen supporters across the country.
Rafsanjani's successful return to the office of presidency, and even his candidature, deserve some scrutiny. In my view, his success offers a great opportunity for psychoanalysis of Iranians and Iranian politics. I also believe that Rafsanjani is not only a genius Iranian politician but, more than that, he is gifted with an extra ordinary psychoanalytical knowledge of the Iranian society. Ali gives a simple but illustrative account of Rafasanjani's endeavor to impact the Iranian psyche in an 'election show' broadcast on TV. Ali is obviously furious with the way Rafsanjani attempts to depict himself as a hero, as a good listener, as a libertarian, or as a compassionate leader. Ali might not believe in a Rafsanjani with those qualities, but how about the rest of the Iranian society? Does the current situation suggest that so far Rafsanjani's psychoanalyticial skills have successfully differentiated him from all other Iranian politicians? What do you think?

Nice police officers - mushroom headquarters

2005-06-13T03:32:00.000-07:00

These days, police officers on patrol in Tehran are so nice to everyone. Have they always been like this? They don't show any interest in reacting even to those who insult them on streets. And one another thing, why are there so many candidates' headquarters everywhere? Does anyone have any idea why, for example, Mehralizadeh would need a headquater in every corner of the city?Or Rezaee?

Who is behind yesterday blasts?

2005-06-12T18:03:00.000-07:00

I posted the following yesterday morning (before the explosions) but then removed in order to make further verifications. However, in the light of yesterday's blasts in Tehran and Ahwas, I think it is worth re-publishing it.

The hardliners (Ossulgarayan) are deliberating on how to reach on an agreement on a single, or ultimately two candidates. It is very much likely that Ahmadi Nejad and Rezai pull out of the competition by Tuesday this week. In the meanwhile, exterimist factions in the camp of Ossulgarayan have already started contemplating on possible post-election strategies. Almost certain that Moeen has little chance to attract a high number of votes, now their main concern is how to deal with Rafsanjani. There have been propositions that, should Rafsanjani win sufficinet votes in the first round to become president, attempt should be made to cause instability and unrest. The proponents of this strategy argue such a rioting shall be provoked in the first place by using Hezbollahi militias and Ansar. They anticipate that the rioting will soon spread as a large number of the public, who are generally unhappy with the regime will also join in. Here, the plan goes, the hardliners should take utmost advantage of their control over Sepah, the Police, as well as the militia. These forces shall not make any attempt to control to stop (perhaps only contain) the riots so that the country will end up in a chaos. Under such circumstances, it is hoped, Rafsanjani would step down, which would then enable Khamenei to invoke Artilce 131 of the Constitution to order a new election - of course without Rafsanjani. But some argue that this plan can better work whenRafsanjani has officially taken office. Their argument is based on the presumption that, should Rafsanjani seem to be unable to control the unrest- which in their opinion will be the case - then the Majlis, controlled by a hardliner majority, can easily ask the Leader to exercise his power under Articles 89 and 110 of the Constitution and remove him from the office . Neither of the propositions has yet gained a wide acceptance among Ossulgaras, due to the fear that an unrest may lead to mass uprising which may get out of control and ultimately lead to regime change. In any event, they show how desparate the hardliners are getting to get their hand on to the post they have been deprived of for the past sixteen years.

Let's pray now!

2005-06-12T02:32:00.000-07:00

Kayhan, the hardliner Tehran newspaper, has predicted that at least 30 million Iranians will turn out to vote on June 17. In its editorial, it has even gone so far as to thank God for "this exciting event which indicates peoples participation in demonstrating their unity with each other and the religious government" - as if that 'exciting event' had already happened !! But Kayhan is right, whatever happens on Friday, it is going to be very exciting and will be taken as a move by people to support the religious nature of government not as a sign of opposition to it. And the regime will thank God for it. This is exactly what happened in 1996 when millions voted against the wishes of those who assume they are in charge of people's religion but still peoples' vote counted as an approval of the Islamic regime. This is because every act of Iranians, as subjects of the Islamic regime is seen as being religious (Labayk) as long as it serves the Mullah's ends. In line with this, Ayatollah Messbah Yazdi offers a very interesting guideline as to how to determine "the best candidate":

"One should never underestimate the impact of praying and recoursing to Imams in elections. In early years of the revolution, there were people who would fast during the period of elections [...] lest an incompetent individual would get elected. I am not sure whether this practice still exists among religious and sacred [sic] individuals. However, if they would deliberately forsake this important issue, it is unfair that we, whose flesh is of the bread of the Imam Zaman (the 12th Imam) [he means that he and his followers are indebted to the Imam] do not recourse to him and [turn up at polls] wihtout praying to him in advance for the best of the world of Islam."

Thus, the regime is hoping that on Friday, 30 million Iranians will first say their prayers to the Imam, then will go to peform their religious obligation at the ballots by casting their vote for the Islamic regime. But perhaps Messbah and Kayhan and their likes must first say prayers to the Imam to help them get at least half of that number to turn up at the poll stations.

2005-06-11T03:08:00.000-07:00

Everyone I asked about the election this morning believed that Rafsanjani would win it. Obviously, the old guy's propaganda campaign has been far more successful than expected. Here are the most common reasons given by those who believe that the Godfather of the Islamic regime will -or shall- come out victorious:
"All this election is a show. The regime has already appointed its next president: Rafsanjani"[Yes, it is a show but why should Rafsanjani get the joy of it?]
"Rafsanjani is the best person to lead Iran out of the international crisis it is currently facing" [No he is not!]
"At least Rafsanjani can contain Khamenei and disallow him to become the absolute power" [No, he can not!]
"Rafsanjani is an Islamic liberal, and this is what we need at a time when Iran is trying to become global" [No, he is not, and Iran cannot become 'global' under a president who see himself above the law]

Very superficial, aren't they?
But I am really stunned by the extent to which Iranians' judgement has changed in only a few years. Six years ago, the image they had of Rafsanjani was nothing but that of a murderer. A cruel dictator who kills mercilessly. Now they see him as a powerful leader who can save them against threats. And apparently, no one has the courage to challenge this absolute wrong and in fact dangerous belief. Akbar Ganji was the last man who had the guts to stand up against the Godfather. But now all the writers and the so called politicians and intellectualls are in a frustrating silence. Islamic republic is falling back to the arms of its Godfather. The dictator is pairing his boots.

Latest moves by the candidates

2005-06-09T22:56:00.000-07:00

I have just spoken to the person who had provided me with the poll results that I published in my post on Wednesday. I asked him whether he knew why there were such big inconsistencies between the results he had given to me and those published by the ISPA. This is what he had to say:

"All latest polls show that, Rafsanjani and Moeen are ahead of other contenders. But there are organisations that are publishing fake polls for their own particular purposes."

Thus, it seems that, if no unexpected adverse events occur, Hashemi and Moeen will make it to the secound round of the elections. Hashemi, however, certainly likes to knock out Moeen in the first round, as things might not turn his (i.e Rafsanjani's) way in the second round. Thus, he and his camp are doing their best to create a (false) belief among the public that Hashemi is well ahead and will win the elections. On the other hand, some in the camps of Larijani, Ahmadi Nejad, and Ghalibaf have come to the conclusion that, as they have very little chance to win in the current situation, they must, by any means, prevent people from voting for Hashemi or Moeen. One such means is to use violence. A case in point is the recent hand gerenade attack against Mohammad Reza Khatami (Moeen's apponted vice-president in his government). What other strategies might opponents of Moeen come up with? We shall wait and see. The main show starts tomorrow with the beginning of the last pre-election week in Iran.

Comments on ISPA's "latest poll"

2005-06-09T17:10:00.000-07:00

Iranian Students Polling Agency ISPA has published its "latest polls results", a summary of which can be found on Iran Scan (by Hoder). As one can clearly see, there are remarkable discrepancies between figures in ISPA's poll and the figures I recently referred to (see my previous post). The poll to which I referred yesterday was conducted over two weeks in Tehran by a governmental centre. The number of participants in this poll was significantly higher than that of ISPA, and the survery was conducted across all districts of Tehran.
What surprises me about ISPA's results is that it indicates that Moeen is far behind Rafsanjani in Tehran - by almost 30%. However, according to the results I have been given, there is only around 5% difference between their overall chances, with Rafsanjani being ahead. Furthermore, the percentage of those who have said "I will not vote" fluctuated between 55 to 65, whereas in IPSA's poll this figure drops to as low as 11%.
I do not want to readily doubt the authenticity of ISPAs poll but I think it must be treated with extreme caution.

2005-06-08T23:57:00.000-07:00

Celebration in Tehran

2005-06-08T23:56:00.000-07:00

Celebrations in Tehran, June 8, 2005 (Photos by M. P)

An update

2005-06-08T21:41:00.000-07:00

My apologies for my rather long disappearance. The reason was that I was robbed after I came back from my trip to Garmsar. My notebook (laptop) is gone now, with all my notes and files and everything. Thankfully I had back ups on USB for some of those files , otherwise I would be dead! In any event, now I have to go to police station almost everyday which is such a big hassle! However, I make sure I update this blog more regularly. There are so many things going in Iran, I really do not know which one I can write on.

One important development was the coalition between Moeen's supporters and the group called "Melli-Mazhabi (Nationalist-Religious)". This comes at a time when letters from three political prisoners with affinities with the Melli-Mazhabi group. In their letters, Hoda Sabe, Reza Alijani, and Taghi Rahmani, give details of abuses and violations of their human rights the had undergone. The letters are addressed to Mr Khatami and Mr Shahroudi. I wonder what Khatami can do about them. Also, if elected, would Moeen be able to guarantee their release? I doubt it.

Another development in the camp of hardliner was that there are speculations as to the possible withdrawal of one or two contenders. It is said that Ahmadi Nejad and Rezai will move out of the contest shortly before the 17th of June.

I also heard from a very reliable source that polls (in Tehran) show that Larijani and Ghalibaf are almost neck and neck and Moeen's popularity is rising steadily. The latter is good news, but the former? The turn-out in Tehran is estimated to be somewhere around 25 to 35 per cent. However, I understand that some polls may indicate otherwise.

One more thing. Last night, Iran's football (soccer) team beat Bahrain to secure its ticket for the World Cup. The whole nation was in joy after the match. They were dancing on the streets, playing music, sounding their cars' horn, as the police were watching them: powerless and themselves bemused with such a national spirit. Some were also carrying posters or banners in favour of some candidates. Some others were backing a boycott on the elections. But many did not seem to really care about the elections at all. People were happy and cheerful. Extremely so! It was a national moment of joy.

Windsteed's elections diary - Part One

2005-06-04T23:26:00.000-07:00

It is long weekend in Iran. It is the sixteenth anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Everywhere is closed for three days. There is nothing but mourning shows on telly. Men in black hitting their head and chest in mourning their Imam. I thought the best thing to do during these holidays was to leave Tehran and travel around a little bit. Since my return to Iran I had not have the chance to leave Tehran. I also wanted to see what people outside Tehran think about the elections.

So I took on the road. Destination: Garmsar, a town in 100 Km south east of Tehran. I had to drive to Jaddeye Khorasan (Khorasan Road). Tehran was still quiet at that time of the morning. Posters of candidates pasted everywhere: on houses, bridges, light-posts. On the way, I drove past the new parliament building in Baharestan square. Wow! It was spectacular, especillay its huge green pyramid. I was told that billions of Rials were spent on this construction. Its budget law was passed during the parliamentary session when the conservatives were in control. Those whose slogan these days is to avoid luxury and lavishness in social and political life.

Pakdasht

Pakdasht was the first town that I reached on the way to Garmsar. The first thing that caught my eyes from distance was the thick layer of dust and smug that had settled on the town. Pakdasht is surrounded by factories and brick-klins. It is working-class town and has a high population of Afghan refugees.

I was feeling a bit thirsty, so I thought that I just stop there and pop into a local store, get a soft drink and maybe talk to a local about politics, something that almost every Iranian is interested in and alwasy has an opinon about. The local store I went to was run by a man in his fifties. I greeted him and asked for a bottle of Delster (non-alcoholic beer). As he was getting me the drink, I told him that I wanted to know his opinion about the elections. He first asked me if I were a spy! I assured him that I was not, but only interested in knowing his views. This is what he said:
"What difference will it make? Whoever wins the elections, it will make no difference to people. One goes, another one comes. They are all the same. They only think about their pocket, not the public. None of them knows how people live, how they suffer. They live their luxurious lives. People are in poverty, there is insecurity, but no one seems to care."

I asked him if he knew any of the candidates. He said:
" I know that man, Ghalibaff. He was the chief commander of the police. It was during his time in office when innocent Pakdashti childern were raped and murdered. If he were a competent commander, he could have saved the children, he could have done something to prevent so many children from being killed. But he did not do anything. Now he wants to run the country. God help us all! I know Rafsanjani and Karoubi too. They are Mullahs. That's why some people tend to trust them because they think Mullahs are sacred, are not theives. But I doubt it. I doubt whether Mullahs can really run the country."

Then someone came in and the shop owner stopped talking. I thanked him for the drink and said goodbye. He said: "goodbye, but just make sure that I don't get into trouble because of what I said, I already am in lots of trouble!"

To be continued...

A small explanation

2005-06-02T03:59:00.000-07:00

I came across this comment by WishMeLuck :
"In response to fellow Iranian bloggers who are promoting Dr. Mostafa Moin (moeen) in the upcoming Iranian election (a.k.a. Iran elections 1384/ Iran Votes 2005): renaming "eslah-talabs" (reformer) to "mosharekati" (affiliates of Islamic Iran Participation Front) is like putting lipstick on a pig. A pig is a pig with or without lipstick. These people neither believe in eslahat (reforms) nor mosharekat (participation). Their idea of reforms and participation is nothing but endless talks and pseudo-philosophical debates about the relation between the government and the governed, designed to deceive the people."

I would like to make it clear that I totally agree with WishMeLuck on that point . That's exactly why I try to make sure , as much as possible, to put the term reformist in quotation marks ("), or condition the term by using "the so-called reformist(s)". However, let's admit the fact that they (i.e. Mosharekatis) are regarded as 'reformers' by many inside and outside the country.

The other side of Rafsanjani

2005-06-01T00:04:00.000-07:00

Mr. Rafsanjani says that he has no money to spend on his election campaigns. There was no sadder sight than Rafsanjani's broken-hearted face as he was lamenting bitterly over his financial problems. Poor thing! But did he really think that people were going to believe that the King of Iranian pistachio who has lots of shares in numerous businesses in Iran has gone so bankcrupt that now he does not even have a penny to spend on his election campaign?
Three possibilites spring into mind. The first is that Rafsanjani is so down to earth type of man. He wants to tell people that despite my high financial status, I want to at least pretend that I live like the majority of the people who are in deep economic trouble these days. He is desparately trying to win people's hearts by trying to convince them that he is one of 'them'.
Or, there is a second possibility: maybe Rafsanjani thinks that people are stupid. One would have expected that he would at least try to change this misperception after people showed their back to him in the parliamentary elections in 2000. Well obviously he has not. Otherwise he would not have placed a bid for this elections, would he? But I am still confident that he does not think that people are that stupid. They might have forgotten about his role in political murders, or in the economic chaos, etc. but they cannot really forget that this man is the Godfather of a corrupt rich clan who have their dirty hands in every dirty businesses in Iran. But I am inclined to go with Possibility No. Three: see, I don't believe that Rafsanjani is really trying to convince people that he is poor. In fact, I think, he is making this up to make people think about his 'almighty' absolute power. He wants people to find out for themselves that this 71 year old veteran is still functioning like a hard-hootered hunky action-boi. My belief is reinforced as I review the photos of him on ISNA newsagency website, showing him as if he is flirting with a young attractive girl sitting next to him. All I can see is a cool Mr. Rafsanjani posing as a smooooooooooooth, nice, charming, and of course, powerful president. Yes, Mr. Rafsanjani, we have been thinking a lot. You are still the one and only Man: strong, rich, powerful, and...?

Watch out Mr. Rafsanjani, too much love will kill you!!

2005-05-31T18:07:00.000-07:00

more photos on Gooya

"See that face on the billboard? That man is me!"

2005-05-31T00:45:00.000-07:00

Today, as the "third phase of advertising campaign" begins, the candidates will be seen on the billboards across a number of major cities in Iran. So we now must see the charismatic faces of the cadidates on the big screen too. This means that all those posters and advertisements were not enough to convey their messages. But I wonder what is left that could not be said in newspapers, TV and radio interviews etc. What does the regime trying to prove by all these gestures? That this is a free election? "Jesus he knows me, he knows I'm right"...

Lebanon first round polls results

2005-05-31T00:30:00.000-07:00

A low turn out despite the first free election in the country.

Mr.President! Where are you?!

2005-05-30T23:57:00.000-07:00

Last saturday, a 20 year old boy was shot dead by a police officer who is a Mullah as well (what a nice combination isn't it?). This occured in Karaj subway (20 Km west of Tehran). Obviously, the officer had seen the boy 'verbally harassing' a girl, so he goes towards him and after exchanging a few words, BANG! He kills the boy!
Well, this is not directly relevant to the elections. Or perhaps it is? Wasn't it Rafsanjani who just recently said that people should feel secure in their daily lives? Or wasn't it General Ghalibaf who said that Iranian police officers are totally and whole-heartedly at the service of the people? Hasn't this appalling incident moved Mr. Larijani, who is travelling around these days to let people know about his 'government of hope'?
No reaction. Silence. Ignorance. They are too busy elsewhere. These are our would-be presidents. These are who publish manifesta promising prosperity for the youngsters. I for one am overwhelmed by how secure and prosperous I feel as I read the news on the murder of Ali Ahmadi Pour in Karaj, an incident which so far has failed to generate the smallest reaction from the actual and potential presidents of my country.

Rafsanjani announces his manifesto

2005-05-29T19:34:00.000-07:00

The highlights of 'Rafsanjani's manifesto' was published in Shargh newspaper today. It is said that this agenda was prepared with the collaboration of a number of academics under the supervision of Mohamad Ali Najafi a former cabinet minister during Rafsanjani's presidency.
However, the manifesto does not contain anything significantly radical. It reflects a number of facts about the society and its needs and expectations. But there is nothing to suggest that Rafsanjani has made a pledge to respond to those needs and demands that he acknowledges in his manifesto. For instance, there is a section on 'social development, security, and peace of mind [sic]'. It tells us that "it is the task of the state to create peace, satisfaction, and secuirty in the society and to furnish the citizens of a situation in which they feel prosperous and take pride living in the country." I wonder how much research those academics have conducted to reach to this 'finding'! Moreover, now that Rafsanjani has at last understood that people need to feel secure, one might ask how he would guarantee that his government will not act in any way to violate people's sense of security. The manifesto says that "Hashemi believes that a crucial strategy in social development is to avoid interfering in people's private and family life [sic] and to support promoting social and civil institutions." Again, this merely reflects a belief and does not sound like that Rafsanjani is making a promise as to guaranteeing that if he gets into power, his government will no longer put its nose in every area of peoples' lives. Furthermore, it would have been very helpful if Rafsanjani had clearly defined his understanding of the 'private' and its boundaries.

Iran's accession to WTO still not a key campaign issue!

2005-05-29T18:13:00.000-07:00

Last week, the WTO finally voted to start membership talks with Iran after the United States lifted its long-standing opposition to Tehran's bid. It is still doubtful whether the candidates have realized the significance of the WTO decision and the difficult road ahead for Iran. Many still see accession to the WTO as a sheer economic process which, according to this perception, will entail repercussions for the country's economy only. For instance, Larijani, one of the contenders, while approving Iran's move to join the WTO, has warned against the consequences of accession for domestic industry. Therefore, he has suggested that before full accession, "it is essential that the context for accession be ready". In his view, the context for accession is ready when "the quality and types of our products" meet world standards. What seems to have escaped Mr. Larijani is that the rules of the WTO are not limited to those that govern the quality of the goods or those that regulate tariffs. In fact, by acceding to the WTO, Iran will give consent to become part of a system which is increasingly moving towards a harmonized and uniform system of global regulations and structures. Thus, Iran will no longer be free to lay down whatever trade rules it wishes. Gloabl system narrows the range of policy options available to states both in trade law and human rights. In other words, the WTO is representative of a global economic structure where the power of trade is used to advance critical non-economic objectives. Then, given its record of human rights as well as the existence of practices which threaten the rule of law, will Iran be ready to become part of this system in the near future? What polciy mechanisms will be put in place to ensure that Iran will meet the criteria to become part of the gloabl economic system? These are crucial issues that unfortunately seem to be left out of the candidates' agenda.

Let's be patient this time!

2005-05-26T21:50:00.000-07:00

Since Moeen's disapproval (and the subsequent reapproval) debates are continuing as to whether he should stand or withdraw. I do not want to participate in that debate directly here. Rather what concerns me here is that these debates reflect a deep confusion among Iranians. They do not really know what they are expecting from a certain candidate, or a future president. Equally, there seems to be little understanding of boycotting the election and its probable consequences. For me, this is a historical/cultural/psychological problem.
Iranians are very good at doing something without having properly evaluated advantages or disadvantages of their action. They easily get passionate and excited about something or someone without knowing why. On the other hand, they tend to lose their hope and patience very easily. This especially happens when they get on the road towards a particular end, but the road takes longer than what they had expected. In this case, they simply tend to destroy everything that they had been building to get up to there. However, the problem is that when Iranians destroy what they have, they do it without having a reasonable idea of what could replace it.
Now, this confusion seems to be recurring in the lead up to the election. Many are talking about boycotting the election. Some have gone even further to the extreme by arguing that a boycot will guarantee the end of the regime! OK, let's assume that boycot is the best option. But do we not know that the hardliners, and those who need the election stamp in their ID will still turn up at the polls? So what will happen then? Will Ghalibaf or Rafsanjani continue on what has been gained during Khatami's time? The answer might be:"come on! what did we gain during Khatami?nothing!" Then, my answer will be, if one is just ignoring or underestimating achievments by people during Khatami's era (note, I am saying people's achievement, I am not saying Khatami's or his government's achievements) he or she is taking that destructive approach to which I already referred. Now let's go with those naives who think boycot will readily end Islamic regime in Iran. Wushsh! No Islamic Republic now? So what now? Will a democratic regime come to replace it? Where from? Or will it be created overnight? By whom? Will democracy brought to us by the so-called opposition groups abroad, who, after 27 years since the Revolution, still do not have a clear, understandable agenda for Iran? The oppositions that are stuck with their worn-out, old-fashioned, and corrupt parties?
For heaven sake! Some of us Iranians just get too bored too early. Some of us do not want to fight for our hopes. A Great Iran cannot be created overnight, nor can it be created by those who are concerned with everything but Iran and Iranians. Let's be patient this time, let's do not destroy everything again. Let's don't listen to those who just want to spread violence and hatred. Let's move on, however slowly, with what we have started and have sacrificed for it. Let's prove for once that Iranians know what they want and they know how they want it.

Moeen's dilemma

2005-05-24T15:36:00.000-07:00

The GC has finally approved Moeen. In its statement, the GC points out that it has done so, only "in obeying the Leader's administrative order (Hokm Hokumati, this is a technical term drawn from Islamic jurisprudence). Administrative orders issued by the Leader as a form of intervention outside the legal process have frequently been opposed by the 'reformists'. For instance, in 1999, when the Leader issued such an order demanding the sixth Majlis (dominated by the reformists) to withdraw a draft amendment to the laws on freedom of newspapers, the reformists MPs objected to the order as being 'illegal', on the grounds that there was no legal provision that could serve as a basis for legitimacy of such orders.
This time, however, the Leader has issued an adminstrative order beneficial to the only reformist candidate in the upcoming election. So now the question is whether Moeen will act on this order or will he dismiss it as illegal and withdraw from running for election. Some argue that if Moeen makes the decision to act on the Leader's order and run for the election, he will lose public confidence, as he and the party he represents will be regarded as hypocrtics. Others say that he should hold on to this opportunity at any cost. He must not pay any attention to the 'games' surrounding this process, but only focus on winning the election and in this way keep hardliners away from becoming the all powerful in the country. But what would happen if Moeen does so but eventually loses in the election? In fact, this is very likely. The disqualification incident must have at least helped Moeen to realize that he does not have a wide enough base among the public. The very limited reaction to his disqualification easily proves this point. This does not, however, mean that the public have less confidence in Moeen compared to other candidates. Rather, as I have said before, the issue is that Iranians, or at least the majority, are very confident that they have no confidence in NONE of these candidates. So, what will the best option be for Moeen in this situation? This is a dilimma that may not be solved easily.

2005-05-23T18:03:00.000-07:00

Student demonstration inside Tehran University dorm (Photo: BBC Persian)

A 'Wise' Move by Khamenei

2005-05-23T15:54:00.000-07:00

"Iran's supreme leader has ordered the Guardian Council to reconsider a ruling barring two reformists from standing for the presidency". This latest move by the Leader is a very tactical one. It implies that he was unaware of the final list of the qualified candidates published by the GC on Sunday night. But one should be very naive to believe this was actually the case. The GC would never make such a big decision without consulting with the Leader in advance to get his approval. However, the Leader was concerned that disqualifying the only major reformist candidate might cause social and political unrest. His concerns turned out to be true: immediately after the GC's ruling on disqualifications was announced, reformists (Jebheye Mosharekat and Sazman Mojahedin Enghelab in particular) directed their attacks towards the Leader himself. In the meanwhile, there were reports Tehran University students held a meeting in TU dormitory, chanting slogans against the GC and, occasionally, against the Leader. Khamenei was ready to make the move. He issued the order, which silenced, at least temporarily, the reformists and ended the student meetings.
A close reading of Kayhan editorial confirms that Khamenei's move was planned well in advance. Hossein Shariatmadari writes: "if [those whose favourite candidate has been disqualified] believe the presence of their candidate is in [regime's] best interest, they must appeal to the Supreme Leader to resolve the problem, not to the Guardian Council whose job is not to determine what [regime's] best interest is."[i.e. Kayhan believes the Guardian Council is an impartial body]. If Jebheye Mosharekat (the so called reformist party), who have always been critical of the Leader's arbitrary and partial (hardliner) stance would appeal to the Leader as Kayhan encourages them to do, then they would explicitly acknowledge the role of the Supreme Leader as a neutral arbiter. But when neither Jebheye Mosharekat nor Moeen appealed to the Leader to play the neutral arbiter role, Kayhan and the Leader were frustrated, although not entirely. The Leader was intent to demonstrate his neutrality. Thus, Haddad Adel, the Majlis speaker who is also father-in-law to Khamenei's son was given the mission to write a letter to the Leader, asking him for his 'kind and wise' intervention.
There is another trick in the editorial as well. Throughout, it tries to give the impression that it was written before the Leader's order was issued (so the writer was totally unaware of what move the Leader was going to make). However, at the end of the editorial, the writer says: "in the last minutes of publishing this editorial, information came in that the Supreme Leader, upon a letter by the Majlis speaker, has written a letter to the GC to, while acknowledging its services,ask for reconsidering the qualification [sic] of Dr Mostafa Moeen and Eng. Mohsen Mehralizadeh. This wise decision, like always, has resolved any concern [...]". Kayhan editorial writer is right. It was a very wise move indeed. While it is very unlikely that the GC makes any change in the first ruling, the Leader will once again come out 'clean' out from a political fraud, pretending that he had no role in creating it.

The GC disqualifies Moeen

2005-05-23T00:02:00.000-07:00

"The Guardian Council disqualifies Moeen". This is the headline of many Iranian newspapers today. However, this behaviour by the GC comes at no surprise (see my post on February 22). The GC did what it had to do: preventing opponents of the Supreme Leader from getting into the top job. But Iranians are now waiting to see how Khatami administration will react this time. Will it give in to the pressures from the Conservatives and the Sepah and run the election according to the wishes of the Leader (i.e. in the same way as it dealt with the massive disqualifications by the GC before the 7th Parliamentary elections in 2004)? Or will Khatami take this last opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to freedom, by fiercely opposing the conduct of the GC and, eventually, by stepping down from power if the GC fails to reconsider its stance? The regime, once again, has shown its zero tolerance for free elections. Let's hope Khatami will not disappoint the people, once again, by showing zero commitment to his promises.

Election Update

2005-05-21T00:28:00.000-07:00

With only five days left until the Guardian Council officially announces the name of the candidates who can run for the presidential election in June, rumours have already spread that Mostafa Moeen (backed by the so-called reformists) is among those who have been disqualified by the GC. On the other hand, Abad Garan Coalition, has withdrawn its support for Ghalibaf. While Abadgaran has not yet announced its main candidate, but it seems that its members are trying to decide between Ahmadi Nejad (Tehran Mayor) and Larijani. However, reports of a recent meeting between Ahmadi Nejad and Larijani have added to the speculation that Ahmadi Nejad will soon withdraw from running for the election in favour of Larijani. Given that Mohsen Rezaee's withdrawal is very likely and in fact very imminent, observers believe that the regime wants the election to be a contest with three candidates: Rafsanjani, Ghalibaf, and Larijani. If this turns out to be true, the Islamic Republic must be prepared to face a number of consequences. These include repercussions for the legitimacy of the president's mandate, considering that it is very unlikely that any of these three possible contenders will be able to win over fifty per cent of the overall votes (of course one must add to this the probable low turn out, should these three be the only contenders). Furthermore, Moeen's disqualification by the GC will lose the regime any chance to at least be able to pretend, as a form of gesture politics, that it is running a fair and legitimate election.

Say NO to Sepahis!

2005-05-17T22:14:00.000-07:00

Browsing some Farsi websites and blogs, I came across a number of comments arguning that there is nothing wrong with having a president with military background. They justify their point by saying that those who have served in military are in fact better able to run a country, considering that, they argue, part of the training in military is about discipline and patriotism. This could generally be the case, but what seems to be ignored is that here we are concerned with a different type of military,that is, Sepah (Iran's Revolutionary Guard).
As a matter of fact, 'patirotism' has no place in the the dominant ideological discourse in Sepah. In Sepah, as in Artesh -the other constituting force of Iranian army, there is an Office of Ideological and Political teachings (Aghidati-Siyasi). All Sepah members must attend the courses offered by this office on regular basis. Ironcially, there is no mentioning of patriotism in these courses. Instead, there are teachings about Islam. But not a tolerant or pluralistic interpretation of Isalm. Rather, the dominant ideology is based on an understanding of Islam which is nowadays refered to as 'radical Islam'.
Sepahis are thus brainwashed, under most advanced and sophisticated methods, to be prepared to 'defend Islam' by whatever means possible, even if it would take them to commit most horrendous acts agains their own compatriots. Defending Iran and Iranians is secondary to defending Islam. Therefore, if a Sepahi comes to choose between defending a Bahai Iranian and a Muslim man of another nationality, the teachings oblige him to take up the second option.
I have lots of evidence, including many from my personal experience, to back up my point here, but I guess mentioning one would suffices to establish my argument that it is very dangerous, not only for Iran but possibly for the whole region, to have a Sepahi as Iran's president. That evidence is the notorious letter, which the commanders of Sepah wrote to Khatami shortly after he had taken office in 1997. In that letter top ranking Sepahi commanders, Ghalibaf among them, warned Khatami to take action to limit the freedom people were starting to enjoy, otherwise they (i.e. Sepahis) would 'know how to handle the situation'. How many democtaric countries in the world do we know where the national army, whose responsibility is to defend people and their freedom, threatens to confront its own people? Is it not a solid evidence to prove the 'anti-patriotic' characterisitc of the dominant ideology in Sepah? Then how can we elect a Sepahi as the president of our nation?

Election update

2005-05-15T23:17:00.000-07:00

1)According to reports, 1010 men and women have registered for the 9th presidential elections. What this implies, I think, is that many still do not really seem to understand what the term president, or head of a nation means.
There were a number of famous figures among those who registered,. Nasser Hejazi was one of them. He was Iran's goalkeeper in in 1970s, and former captain and head coach of one the two most favourite football sides in Iran, that is, the Esteqlal team of Tehran (the other being Persepolis). Obviously not many have taken his bid for candidature seriously enough, but I think if he manages to get through the GC filter, he will certainly pose a challenge to other contenders. Let's not forget he possesses many qualities that others surely lack. To mention a few, he has the charismatic character, he has the look, he is very well-known and popular, and, on top of all that, he is certainly not a "Hezbollahi" (i.e. he can hardly be see a figure with affiliations to the regime).I am certain the GC will weigh up the benefits of approving him. Among others, they might consider that Hejazi might be able to attract the youth's votes and in this way prevent those votes from going to a reformist (anti-hardliner) candidate (which has often been the case). However, they might also consider disqualifying Hejazi for his lack of 'practical belief in the 'principle of velayat faghih'or on the grounds of his probable connections with the Monarchy before the Islamic Revolution.
2)As anticipated, Rafsanjani's candidature has upset the conservative hardliners, particularly those loyal to the Leader Khamenei. Yesterday, a number of Majlis deputies fiercefully reacted to a speech by one of their colleagues, in support of Rafsanjani. Bahonar, Majlis' acting speaker who is also the head of Larijani's election headquarters, criticised that MP for making such comments in support of a candidate in the Parliament. Bahonar reminded the MP of the 'rule' made by MPs that no statement be made for or against any candidate.
3)Ebrahim Yazdi, who served as foreign minister of the first post-revolutionary cabinet, also registered to run for the election. As the head of the 'outlawed' Nehzate-e Azadi (Freedom Movement) he has little chance to get through the GC filter.
4)Despite all these recent developmnets, the mood among people has barely changed. Latest polls show that less than fifty per cent of people will cast their votes on the 17th of June. On streets, still there is no sign of excitement about the election. Recalling the mood in the lead up to the past two presidential elections in 1997 and 2001, this calm mood among people is clearly indicative of lack of trust or interest in the candidates.

Moeen on Iranians abroad

2005-05-11T16:48:00.000-07:00

In my previous post, I said that none of the candidates had shown any interest in discussing the situation of the Iranians living outside the country. Browsing Moeen's website, I came across his comments on this issue so it seems that at least one of the candidates is in fact interested.
He was asked about his agenda "to invite Iranians living abroad to invest in Iran". In reply, he had this to say:
"Iranians as persons are more important than their money. People who are standing on the best intellectual levels of Western countries [sic] and they are much more valuable to us than their money. In order to have them back in the country, we must first promote the social and economic status of our intellectual elites and management so that we can make sure no [Iranian citizen] would ever prefer to live away from home rather than to live in their home country".
Moeen's comments may be music to the ears of some of his supporters. However, one must not forget that Moeen served as Minister of Higher Education (the title of the Ministry later changed to Science, Research, and Technology) for almost seven years. During this time, there was no major improvement in higher education. Universities offer minimum service to students. University of Tehran, the top Iranian university, has no dormitory of its own. Non-Tehrani students who can not afford to pay expensive rents in Tehran have to stay in Uni dorms, where they will have to share their room with at least 4 (sometimes 8)other students.
Academic situation is not any better. Particularly in human sciences, including politics and law, research remains very limited due to 'sensitivity' of issues involved. Faculties are not producing updated knowledge. At Tehran Law School, for example, some professors still rely on outdated notes from 1970s when discussing new issues. Access to foreign language journals is also minimal and very limited.
As the Minister for Higher eduacation, Moeen surely had enough time to improve this appalling status of higher education. But he basically did nothing.
Furthermore, Moeen must be reminded that the term "Iranians abroad" does not only inculde the rich or academic Iranians. As I mentioned elsewhere, refugees, asylum seekers, Iranian prisoners abroad, political exiles are also the responsibility of Iranian government. This responsibility has often been left unfulfilled and seemingly there is little to indicate that the future governments will be willing to change this trend.

The election and Iranians abroad

2005-05-10T23:23:00.000-07:00

Dear Visitors,

I have an idea but I'm not sure how far it can travel. I need your help. I am interested in getting some idea about what Iranians living abroad may think about the upcoming election.
As it stands, none of the so-called candidates shows any interest in talking about thousands of Iranians living abroad (as if they were not Iranian!), their difficutlties, the status of Iranian refugees, asylum seekers, students, etc. But what does this silence indicate? I think it is a meaninful silence.
I think this can open up the door for discussing some other issues: hopes and disappointments, trust, future, etc.
So I would like to ask you to please let me know what you think about these issues. For example, do you realy have any hope in any of these candidates to change the situation in Iran in a way that you might consider returning to Iran? Or, another question, do you think any of these contenders has the capacity and resources to change the image of Iran internationally?
I hope this can provide us (you and myself) with an opportunity to discuss the elections from a different perpective.

Looking forward to hearing from you

Rafsanjani: not ready, not steady, but still go!

2005-05-10T23:17:00.000-07:00

As anticipitated, Rafsanjani officially announced his candidature for the presidential elections. Khamenei and buddies, on...your...feet!

Ghalibaf stripped of his title(s)!

2005-05-10T22:22:00.000-07:00

I just love reading Kayhan. I am not a hardliner and I know that most of the times, it is full of lies and accusations. But, what I like about it is that it always has a bared truth in it as well. The truth about how Kayhanis think, how they see the world, how they see people, etc. It easily, without any complication whatsoever, reflects the ideas of those who run it.
Only until a few days ago, Kayhan used to use the title "Dr" when referring to Ghalibaf (Ghalibaf has a PhD in Geography). But, it is not using that title any longer! Why? Maybe Kayhan does not think Ghalibaf deserves 'respect' anymore?
A simple analysis of the events in past few days proves that this is in fact the case. Last week, Ghalibaf was asked by students about what would happen if him and the Supreme Leader are in disagreement on a certain issue. Would he act upon what he sees the best or would he just follow the Leader's order? Ghalibaf replied by explaining that the scope and limits of the Leader's responsibilities are defined in the Constitution (so the Leader must not go beyond those limits). But, what surprised many was Ghalibaf's "boldness" in saying that if finds the Leader's opinion confliction with his, he would follow the Leader only if he (i.e. Ghalibaf) comes to the conclusion that the Leader has a point - other wise "the Leader opinion must change". That boldness, however, did not impress those who believe that Ayatollah Khamenei has been appointed by God as the "Guardian of Muslims"(Vali). "how dares Ghalibaf challenge the God's representative on earth?" They must have asked.
But this is not the end of story. Ghalibaf crossed over another red-line yesterday, when he praised Reza Shah (the founder of Pahlavi dynasti) as an authoritarian figure, who, by using his absolute authority, maintained order in the Iranian society. He even went as far as calling himself a "hezbollahi Reza Shah". Considering how much the ruling clerics and "hezbollahis" detest Reza Shah, it should not be too hard to imagine how much uproar his view generated.
Ghalibaf, however, was quick to reject making any such comments. He even threatened that "appropriate action" would be taken against those who "attributed" such things to him. But his afforts have so far been to no avail. Kayhan is not happy. For Kayhan, a good president is the one who never questions the Leader on anything. He (there will be no female president in Islamic Republic) must understand that what the Leader says and does is the right thing, and the president's duty is simply to obey. Besides, a good president never says good things about the people that the Leader does not like. Be it Reza Shah, or Mossadegh, or anyone else. It does not matter whether they did anything good for Iran. You must not like someone whom your Leader dislikes, even if you are a president of a nation (who do say good things about those whom the Leader dislikes).
Ghalibaf soon realized that his comments made the Leader upset. He tried to make up for those comments - or to apologize. But Kayhan is frank: apology not accepted. No more Dr. Ghalibaf, no more General Ghalibaf. Titles have been erased. And be careful! One more such mistakes, Ghalibaf will be erased too!

No one to trust!

2005-05-05T22:18:00.000-07:00

This week nothing of significance has happened about the election in Iran. However, a speech by Ayatollah Shahroudi (Iran's head of judiciary)raised some debate. In his speech, Shahroudi criticised judicial officials (prosecutors and investigators) as well the police for their 'miconducts'. Some commentators argue that Shahroudi's criticism of the police was in fact aimed at undermining Ghalibaf's position. Ghalibaf claims he is a 'reformist' since, he argues, during his time in office as head of the Iranian police, he managed to bring about reform within the body under his control. In the same way, he has promised to bring about major changes in the government if he becomes a president. Shahroudi's comments on the other hand disclose that Ghalibaf's claims are just lies.
But do Iranians really need Shahroudi to remind them that what Ghablibaf is claiming is unfounded? Iranians deal with the police almost everyday: tickets for driving offences are issued by the police, passports are issued by the police, vehicle registration is processed by the police, many public places are guarded by the police, social behvaiour and social activities are monitored by the police. So the police are hugely present in Iranians daily life, which makes the police and their conduct so readily exposed to public judgement. The public does not need Mr Shahroudi to remind them of the fact that they are not feeling safe in their daily life, that the crime rate has gone up dramatically in past few years -and the police is unable to contain it, that there is nowhere that people can take their complaints of the police misconduct and expect action, that the police are as corrupted, if not more so, as other public institutions.
Besides, who is Shahroudi to criticise the police? The situation in the judiciary is far worse than what we see in the police. Corruption is widespread, there's no justice but justice denied in Iranian judiciary. People have taken justice in their own hands. Besides, the police infringments upon the rights of the people is not without the judiciary's tolerance, ignorance, or support. In fact, as Shahroudi himslef admitted, in most of the cases they do so with previous permission from a judge or prosecutor.

Thus, I do not see any significance in Shahroudi's speech. He just repeated what we all already knew. His speech did not make Ghalibaf's status any worse than what it had already been. Ghalibaf's past is known to the public. Same is true about other candidates. In fact, as we get closer to the election, the task for Iranians in not to decide which candidate they trust the most. Rather, they are having a hard time deciding whom they can be mistrustful of the least.

Rafsanjani drinks the poison hemlock

2005-04-27T16:20:00.000-07:00

As anticipated, Rafsanjani has indicated that he will stand in presidential elections. He is reported as saying that he had to "swallow the bitter pill" of contesting elections "for the sake of country".

This grudging tone of Rafsanjani reminds me of that of Khomeini in his historical letter to the nation in 1988, announcing that Iran had accepted the terms of the UN resolution 598 to end the Iran - Iraq war. To describe how difficult it was for him to succumb to pressures to end the war, Khomeini depicted his decision as "drinking a cup of poison". And it was indeed a strong one. Khomeini died in less than a year after accepting the resolution. Immediately after Khomeini's death, Rafsanjani went on with the rest of his plot (see post:will the ghosts go unleashed) by convincing, with minimal effort, Iran's senior clerics assembly (in charge of appointing a new leader) that the only choice for the post was Ali Khamenei. There are different accounts as to why Rafsanjani did not - or perhaps could not - propose himself as a successor to Khomeini. In any event, Rafsanjani's calculation was that Khamenei would never make a threat to his power. His assumption was based on the fact that during his eight years of presidency, Khamenei had hardly become an influential figure in Iranian politics. Besides, Khamenei was hardly supported by clerics in Qom. Moreover, Rafsanjani was confident that the army (Sepah and Artesh) would be loyal to him, relying on the fact that he had been the acting chief-commander during the eight-year war with Iraq, so he would know how to handle the army.

However, Rafsanjani's calculations did not prove to be right. Soon, Khamenei started to consolidate his position as a the 'number one man' of the country. He took control over Sepah (Pasdaran), the Judiciary, the IRIB (radio and tv)as well as vital hardliner foundations (e.g,Bonyad Shahid, Panzdah Khordad, Bonyad Janbazan). Khamenei also found ways to silence opposing voices in Qom, trying to assert himself as a Mujtahed and Grand Ayatollah. The only branch of government in which Khamenei was left with least influence was the Executive. Neither Rafsanjani, nor Khatami were the obedient type of president he wanted. Particularly during Khatami's tenure, lots of trouble were caused to him and his position. During student protests in 1999, slogans were chanted overtly attacking the supreme leader. A blow to his power came in 1998 when MPs close to Khatami formed the majority in Majlis. They would take every opportunity to attack the Supreme Leaders' attempts to exert absolute power over people. Clearly, this was not something that the Leader could tolerate for long, no more than one Majlis session. Thus, when the time arrived for the 7th Majlis elections, he directly intervened by ordering the Guardian Council to disqualify all candidates who had close ties with Khatami. In this way, Khamenei re-conquered the parliament.

He had plans for the executive too. Soon after taking control over the Majlis, he encouraged Ali Larijani, one of his most obedient servants , to run for elections this year. But this move would disappoint some of his closest frinds , like Velayati, who had for long served the supreme leader, hoping to get rewarded by the second most important job in the country. So, to avoid causing such disappointments, Khamenei made another move: setting up a 'council' which would, apparently, elect the 'most suitable' candidate from among a handful of hardliner candidates. So he ordrered that the CCR be established and run by those loyal to him (see below). However, things did not go according to his plan. Much sooner than he had expected, it became evident that the whole council and its plans were no more than a mere 'show'. The outcome was clear from the beginning: Ali Larijani was the favourite. So, all others, i.e. Velayati, Ghalibaf, Rezaee, and Ahmadi Nejad one by one announced that they would no longer go the CCR's meeting although they respect its final decision (that is, Khamenei's decision). Velayati was the most disappointed of all and sent a clear signal to Rafsanjani that he was shifting to his camp (see my previous post) as a result of Khamenei's failing to back him up.

Now the CCR has officially announced Larijani as its candidate for the election. This gives Rafsanjani all the reasons to believe that Khamenei has a well knitted plan for taking full control over the country. He knows that Khamenei has assumed so much power that he has no hesitation as to encroach upon Rafsanjani's territory anytime he wishes to do so. In effect, during the past few years, many of Rafsanjani's closest allies have been jailed or otherwise removed from office by acts of those bodies under Khamenei's direct order -Karbasschi (former Tehran's mayor) and Nouri (former interior minister) being the most prominent ones among them. Above all, Rafsanjani is also well aware that Khamenei and his followers are lying in wait to get rid of him too. All they need is a good excuse, a 'legitimate' reason to end his life (political or?). Voices are already being heard from Khamenei's camp which overtly accuse Rafsanjani as not respecting the principles of being a 'true revolutionist' (see previous post). On the other hand, Rafsanjani knows that if he becomes president, he has to somehow enter into a deal with the US. If he does so, for instance by entering into negotiations with Americans, he will give the fanatics the best excuse to punish him severely for dealing with the "great Satan". What price will he then have to pay? The same price as Khomeini paid by drinking the cup of poison 17 years ago?

Some already shaking as Rafsanjani makes the decision to return

2005-04-25T00:23:00.000-07:00

Today, a quote from Velayati dominated the Iranian newspapers’ headlines: “opposing Rafsanjani, a precondition for the CCR”. The Persian term used by newspapers is ‘Taghabol’, which can have various connotations. Among others, it can mean to fight against a threat, and not simply opposing in the sense of fighting in a contest, or disagreeing with, in this case, Rafsanjani’s ideas. But was this what Velayati really meant by ‘Taghabol’? It appears not. Velayati has in fact said: “it was brought up in the ‘Council for Cooperation among Revolutionaries’ (CCR) that someone must be elected to run for the presidential election who would be able to stand against Rafsanjani’ (Iran, 25.04.05). In any elections, where there is more than one candidate running, candidates stand against each other. When a group wants to choose a candidate to back him or her up as its favourite candidate, it evaluates its chances against others, especially against those who seem to be in a potentially better position to win the election in question. Therefore, what the CCR has done in weighing up the chances of its potential candidates does not seem to be unusual.
So, what does make it worthwhile to ponder on Velayati's account of what happened in the CCRs deliberations and the way it has been reported by Iranian so-called non-conservative newspapers, particularly Shargh and Iran?
1. What we witnessed in newspapers today is a very delicate attempt to convince the public mind that it is crucial that Rafsanjani –who still says that he is ‘uncertain’ whether or not he should run – must announce his candidacy, and, more importantly, people must vote for him. This is the only way, at least Rafsanjani’s supporters want people to believe, that the threat of an oppressive, fundamentalist government taking control of the government may be avoided. Rafsanjani is the only man who has the capability to resist the increasing power of the hardliners (a corollary of this claim is that Rafsanjani is not a hardliner himself. See below).
2. Relevant to the first point, the reaction of Tehran newspapers diminishes the significance of other candidates who are hoping to win a considerable number of votes and, at least, make it to the second round. In fact, the message conveyed by newspapers to the public is that the real battle is between Rafsanjani and Larijani. What appears to back up this message is that the CCR, whose members have top positions in the government (e.g. Majlis speaker, and men close to the Supreme Leader), does not see Moein or Karoubi as real opponents. One reason for this maybe that the CCR are certain that Moein will not be able to get through the Guardian Council filter. Besides, the polls in Tehran and other major cities show that Karoubi is not among the top three or four canidates at present.
3. Velayati is also quoted as saying ‘the CCR’s members believe that Rafsanjani – despite his remarkable background in Islamic revolution – is not a ‘man of Islamic principles’ (Ossulgara). The regime well knows that the majority of people will not vote for an Ossulgara. They prefer to stay home and not to turn out to vote, rather than to vote for an Islamic principlist – if I can use this term. So, Rafsanjani, if he wants to win (as he surely does), must wipe off this belief (which is a well-founded one) that he is an Ossulgara. He has to distance himself from ‘them’ and have people and media to approve that he is an open-minded reformist – despite his notorious record that clearly he does not believe in equal human rights, he has used terror for political purposes, he is not interested in political development, he does not believe in equal rights for all Iranian citizens, etc.
4. And finally, the recent move by Velayati signals Velayati’s conviction about a couple of issues: first, he will not win the elections and second, Rafsanjani will be the next president of Iran. Velayati has said that he was not selected by the CCR as the favourite contender because of his intention to quit as potential candidate in Rafsanjani’s favour. In other words, he was dismissed by the CCR for he was backing up the non-principalist Rafsanjani. Thus, the message translates into the following:
“Mr. Rafsanjani, once you become president, as I am sure you will, please remember my big sacrifice for you. All I expect is that you return the favour by appointing me as your cabinet’s foreign minister. I promise that I will be as obedient as I was during the eight years at the office in your previous administration.”

Larijani: one step closer to the job

2005-04-23T02:18:00.000-07:00

Shargh reports that the Council for Co-ordinating revolutionaries (CCR) (Shoraye Hamahangiye Niroo Haye Enghelab) has finally reached an agreement by pronouncing Ali Larijani as its favourite candidate for presidency. This does not come as surprise, however. During the past few months, the CCR had signaled on a number of occasions that it was increasingly leaning towards Larijani as its best choice for the election. But the CCR was simultaneously trying to find a way in which all its members would be in agreement with the decision that Larijani should be the sole candidate of the conservatives' camp. The hope to reach such a consensus faded soon with Velayati, Rezaee, and later Ghalibaf and Ahmadi Nejad keeping distance from the CCR by pronouncing themselves as independent contenders.

Who is Larijani? He was born in 1957 in Najaf, Iraq. He was born to a very religious family: his father was the grand Ayatollah Hashem Amoli. He is son-in-law of Ayatollah Motahari, one of the greatest religious theorists of Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Larijani holds degrees in computer sciences as well as in philosophy.

Larijani is a member of Sepah (Iran's revolutionary guards). He has served in Sepah as advisor, deputy, and acting commander during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1992, he was appointed by Ayatollah Ali Khamnei, Iran's supreme leader, as the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting organisation (IRIB). He remained in office until 2004. Now he serves as a member of the expediency Council - again appointed by the leader.

Larijani is a soldier, and like any other soldier, he follows orders. His commander in chief is Ayatollah Khamnei and on a number of occasions Larijani has made it quite explicit how sincere he is in following orders of his commander: one occasion that Iranians have hardly forgotten was when he authorised the broadcast of a footage taken from a conference in Berlin in 2000. There, a number of Iranian political activists were speaking at a conference held by the German Heinrich Boll Foundation. During the speeches, the crowd started to chant anti Islamic regime slogans. A woman got totally naked - obviously in protest to the regime. Airing this footage resulted in a number of arrests. Akbar Ganji, a most prominent political activist who was among speakers in Berlin, was arrested immediately upon his return to Iran. He is still serving his prison and yesterday the Rapporteures Sans Frontiers expressed their concerns over his health condition. Larijani still has "a job to do". He is running for the office, because he has an order to do so. If anyone from among Rezaee, Ghalibaf, and even Ahmadi Nejad, wins the election, given their military background, an era of absolute militarism will dominate Iran. However, if Larijani is elected - a hope which many hardliners are keen to materialise - Iran will face a revival of Islamic fundamentalism. And will that, eventually, lead to the end of Islamic Iran?

Fighting corruption misses out of candidates' agenda

2005-04-21T20:56:00.000-07:00

So far, presidential hopefuls have made many promises: improving the social welfare system, economic reforms, improving the human rights record, etc. But none of them seems to be interested in addressing a most serious issue: corruption. How can these candidates speak with such confidence about the efficacy of their agenda, when they give us no sign as to their willingness or even awareness of to combat corruption?
No one can dispute the fact that corruption is increasingly widespread in Iran. It affects the sense of security among people. It sets the ground for violations of human rights. Corruption among Iranian officials has not a limited scope; rather it is omnipresent: it is everywhere, from top to bottom of the system.

There are numerous corrupt businesses that are run by the elements within the Iranian government. Yet, for some reason, the candidates try to distance themselves from these facts. For instance, this week General Ghalibaf said that he ‘does not believe that there are behind-curtain centres of power’ in Iran. In others words, he does not think that there are influential centres of power outside the official government. Thus, Ghalibaf does not believe that, for example, there are people outside the foreign ministry of Iran who control the foreign policy. Nor does he believe that there are powerful elements that control the Iranian police and its judicial system. Does this mean that he is unaware of the links between those centres of power and organised crime inside and outside the country? Does this mean that former head of the Police is unaware of the fact that a number of top-ranking officials are involved in drug trafficking and people smuggling? Or does Ghalibaf’s claim simply demonstrate his lack of courage to deal with those centres? Then how can he promise the nation that he will work to create ‘a just government’ should he become their president?

Other candidates seem to be lacking in the said courage as well. Of course, in the case of Velayati and Larijani, given their background, it is not surprising that they are not at all interested in discussing corruption and hidden centres of power. And it would be too naïve to expect Hashemi Rafsanjani to consider an anti-corruption policy for his future government. But, one what does stop Moein to make a promise as to combating corruption if he wins the election? This week, he pronounced ‘honesty’ as a basic principle in his plan for ‘management and organizational conduct’. So would he consider it as an indication of honesty to talk to people about corruption and his plans to fight against it? Or will Karoubi, who informed us of his firm intention as to 'not negotiate when it comes to people’s rights’, have the courage to disclose those hidden sources of power? Would he be courageous enough to tell us the truth about those who, for the past eight years, have held control over Khatami’s administration, due to which he was unable to deliver its promises of ‘political development’?

The office of presidency in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran

2005-04-20T00:46:00.000-07:00

Chapter 9 The Presidency

Article 113

After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the country. His is the responsibility for implementing the Constitution and acting as the head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with (the office of) the Leadership.

Article 114

The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people. His re-election for a successive term is permissible only once.

Article 115

The President must be elected from among religious and political personalities [Note: the Constitution uses the term "rajol" which in Arabic means men. This has led to controversy as to whether only men can become preseident or the office is open to women as well. As it stands, the GC is of the opinion that women are not eligible] possessing the following qualifications: Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administrative capacity and resourcefulness; a good past-record; trustworthiness and piety; belief in and commitment to the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official madhhab [i.e. Shi'ite Islam] of the country.

Article 116

Candidates nominated for the post of President must declare their candidature officially. Law lays down the manner in which the President is to be elected.

Article 117

The President is elected by an absolute majority of votes polled by the voters. But if none of the candidates is able to win such a majority In the first round, voting will take place a second time on Friday of the following week. In the second round only the two candidates who received greatest number of votes in the first round will participate. If, however, some of the candidates securing greatest votes in the first round withdraw from the elections, the final choice will be between the two candidates who won greater number of votes than all the remaining candidates.

Article 118

Responsibility for the supervision of the election, of the President lies with the Guardian Council, as stipulated in Article 99.

Jannati sends a harsh warning against crossing the 'red-lines'

2005-04-19T15:07:00.000-07:00

Ahmad Jannati, the secretary of Iran's Guardian Council, says that the country's courts have issued death sentences for some of the Munafeghs (those who betray the regime). But, Jannati says, it is only because executing those "two-faced disloyals" is not in the interest of the country that death penalties are still pending: "as soon as the situation permits (i.e. as soon as the regime feels it is no longer under international pressure or is in the position which allows it to ignore international demands) those death penalties will be implemented.

This is a blunt warning -coming in the lead up to the election - to those would be candidates who are talking about a 'deal' with the West and particularly the US over issues such as Iran's nuclear power, relations with the US and Israel. It is a clear message to those who want to win votes by touching these 'red lines' of the regime. Jannati's speech indicates that in the coming days we should expect some judicial actions against 'undesirable' candidates who do not have criminal record to enable the Guardian Council to disqualify them off hand. Karoubi and Moein are on the top of the list. They both have criticized the State's human rights record and have talked about possible re-establishment of ties with the US. Particularly, Karoubi has been very outspoken in criticising the GC on its decisions that led to a number of disqualification during the last parliamentary elections in 2004 in which almost all nominees from Jebheye Mosharekat and Majma'e Rohanyoon were pronounced ineligible to run for elections.
The GC and the Judiciary will be very busy during the next few weeks.

Lack of popularity: one thing that the would-be- candidates have in common

2005-04-18T21:04:00.000-07:00

With less than two months left to the presidential election, regarded by some as the most crucial one, the public mood in Iran fails to suggest enthusiasm for it.
Perhaps, this has to do, at least in part, with the personality of the would-be candidates. A quick look at the list shows that no one of has the type of personality to attract attention as a future president. Take Mohsen Rezai, for example: the former Commander-in-Chief of Sepah Pasdaran (Iran's revolutionary guard), currently serving as the secretary of the Expediency Council. There is absolutely nothing in his record to indicate he possesses the intelligence that a competent politician must have. He might have been a good soldier (many would argue otherwise) but whether that would make a good president or in fact it may be a counterproductive factor is the question he has to answer. In any event, Rezai is having a real hard time gaining support from the people. Particularly, students and youngsters -who are the key to win an election in Iran - do not seem to show a huge interest in supporting him. It's no surprise and I do not think that Rezai should have slightest hope in hearing slogans from students in his favour. "Rezai Rezai, to omide mai!" (Rezai you are our hope!)?! No, it just doesn't sound realistic. The same holds with Karoubi, Larijani, Ghalibaf, Mehr Alizadeh, Velayati, and Moein. They just lack in the necessary factors. None of them has the charismatic personality. Even Rafsanjani, who may have the intelligence and fortune which might eventually assist him in getting the office, does not have the kind of personality that a 'president of nation' must possess. To win the nation's vote, one needs to be for the nation. It is hard, if not impossible, to choose the president of Iranian nation from amongst this list.

Iran-US relations, no longer a taboo for presidential hopefuls

2005-04-17T02:06:00.000-07:00

In an interview with Shargh newspaper, Mehdi Karoubi - a potential contender in the upcoming elections - spoke of the possibility and the "necessity to be ready to negotiate with the United States". Former Majlis speaker, Karoubi is a leading figure in the leftist "Majma Rohaniyoon Mobarez" (Assembly of Clercis). He is also a member of the expediency Council whose members are appointed by Iran's supreme leader.
In explaining why he considers Iran's relation with the US as a 'necessity', Karoubi said:"I think the majority of people believe that relation with the US will resolve many of the economic and welfare problems". However, he also expressed his disbelief in this "too optimist perception", by referring to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan whose close ties with the US "have not made their [social and economic] state any better". Despite that, Karoubi says he is of the opinion that people must be listened to, while they must "not expect too much from relation with the US".

Defending the re-establishment of ties with the US by a would-be- contenders for the office of president is unprecedented. Since the first presidential elections in 1980, this issue has always been a soc-called 'red-line' for the candidates. 'No negotiation' was the only policy. On a few occasions, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a key figure in Iranian politics and present head of the Expediency Council, had spoken of the possibility of 'conditional negotiations', demanding the US to show a sign of 'good will'. Still two months away from the elections in June, two of the would-be candidates - Moein and Karoubi - have overtly defended the re-establishment of the full relations with US as beneficial to Iran's interest.

Weekly Review (April 7- 14)

2005-04-13T21:28:00.000-07:00

General Ghalibaf stands up to defend justice and freedom

Perhaps the most important news on election this was General Ghalibaf's interview with the media.
Who is Ghalibaf? Born in 1961 in the town of Torghabeh in Khorasan province of Iran, Ghalibaf was one of the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah Pasdaran) commanders during the war with Iraq. He was trained to become a pilot at Sepah's Aviation school. He soon climbed up the ranks to become the Commander in Chief of Sepah's Airforce a few years later. In 2000, Ghalibaf replaced Lotfiyan, the former Iranian Police chief who during and after the students uprisings in the Summer of 1999 was accused of failing to act to properly to prevent the brutal acts committed by the members of Tehran's police and militias against the students. Ghalibaf resigned from his office a week ago, allegedly, to prepare for his candidacy for the elections.
What makes Ghalibaf confident to win the elections? It seems that he is heavily relying on what he considers as achievements during his time in office as the commander in chief of Iranian police force. During this time, Ghalibaf tried to change the public perception of the police. Arguably, the most significant of his initiatives in this respect was the establishment of Police 110 (an equivalent of 911 in the US or OOO in Australia): an easily accessible emergency police station. Also, during this time, Iranian police underwent some remarkable reforms in terms of its technical capabilities. Perhaps the most noticeable of all to Tehranis were the new Elegance Mercedes Benz police vehicles made especially for Iranian police force by the German automobile company. However, immediately after their appearance on streets people became suspicious of the financial source which made this huge buy possible. There were rumours that the money that was received from European countries, especially Britain, to empower Iranian police against drug traffickers in Eastern Iran was spent on the new vehicles. Almost at the same time, the black Land Cruiser Toyotas were used by the police. These vehicles became incredibly notorious among the public. They were used by Tehran's Special Force (Yegan Vijeh) who were, among other things, authorized to arrest unmarried boys and girls. Moreover, there would be judge among the police so that when an unmarried couple were caught, the judge would issue the judgment on their crime on the scene which then would follow by an order to the couple to marry. There were also a number of cases reported in which the police officers had abused women. The acts committed by this force were so brutal that had convinced some in Tehran to believe that those police officers were not Iranian. There was a common rumour that they had come from Arab countries such as Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq. A rumour that was later denied by the police authorities. The most recent notorious acts committed by the police under Ghalibaf's command include the serial arrest of journalists, thinkers, and webloggers, and the incident at Azadi Stadium in which 7 people died after a match between Iran and Japan football teams. In the latter incident, the police are accused of blocking the some of the exits of the stadium.

Now Ghalibaf is claiming that he defends religion, justice and freedom. There are a number of interesting points in his interview but I just touch upon one of them: his constant laying of stress on that he does not belong to the hardliners camp and more importantly the repeating instances in which he referred to rights of people and justice. Regardless of the possibility of his winning the elections, it is interesting to hear how men like Ghalibaf who come from a background of working with or being in charge of institutions who had the least interest in rights.

Finally, the language used by the hardliner Tehran newspaper is also noteworthy. He referred to Ghalibaf as "Doctor Ghalibaf" - instead of using the usual title "Sardar" (General). (Ghalibaf apparently has a B.S in Geography (but he never attended any class at the Uni, nor any exams. A friend of mine was one of his lecturers and he told me that we would simply give him a pass mark without requiring him to sit exams). His PhD in Political Geography has the same story behind it too). Obviously "Doctor" has less, or no, violence or imposing authority tone it than Sardar!

Will the ghosts go unleashed?

2005-02-27T13:32:00.000-08:00

Rafsanjani says he is still undecided as to whether or not run for the elections. He says that he wishes that "competent, able, and virtuous people" come forward. If this happens, then he will no longer be "worried" and will not have to nominate himself.
Rafsanjani was first 'elected' as Iran's president in 1989. Before, he had served as Majlis (Iran's parliament) speaker. The 1989 election was not more than a show -as was the case in all but one (1979) previous presidential elections. Rafsanjani's only opponent was Dr Abbas Sheybani (a Majlis PM) who was simply put there so that the election would not seem too fake. Rafsanjani 'won' the majority of the votes. To my memory, Sheybani won only 3000 votes!!
In this way, Rafsanjani rose into the second most powerful position. However he was seen as the most powerful man in Iran. Hence the nickname "Akbar Shah" which implied Rafsanjani's ambitious personality: an unknown man, an ordinary talabeh, whose rise to power owed much to the elimination of a number of key figures in Iranian politics: Motahhari, Beheshti, Mofatteh, Montazeri, and, on top of all, Ayatollah Khomeini, who had died just a few weeks before the election in 1989.
How did Khomeini's death help Rafsanjani reach to the status of the most powerful man in Iran? I shall discuss it in more details later. But for now let me just deal with a hugely overlooked question: did Khomeini really die of cancer as it was reported by officials? My answer is NO! Khomeini did not even suffer from cancer. There are a few people who would, if they could, testify to the truth of my claim: Dr Iraj Fazel (the chief surgeon of the operation on Khomeini in May 1989), Dr Hasan Arefi, Dr Mohammad Reza Zafar Ghandi (now the head of Tehran University's School of Medicine) and a few others. Surprisingly, however, the medical case of Khomeini has never been discussed anywhere. It has never been put forward for scientific discussion in any conference or seminar. What type of cancer was Khomeini suffering from? According to the most referred account, he died of prostate cancer (another account says he died of heart attack after the operation). But let's not forget that Khomeini was under constant medical examination, so it could be easily detected and treated before getting to a stage that its spread would get out of control.
Why would someone from Khomeini's few confidantes want to kill him? What happened to those who knew about the plot for killing the Ayatollah? Did Khamnei know about the plot? Why didn't he say anything about it then? Does he fear his own life now? What is Rafsanjani's serious concern these days?

I will answer these questions in my future postings.

2005-02-23T14:43:00.000-08:00

Mostafa Moein (ISNA)

Will the GC let Moein run for elections?

2005-02-22T21:21:00.000-08:00

The Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) is not yet fully certain as to whether Mostafa Moein can get through the Guardian Council filter. The head of Moein's campaign, Ali Shakouri Rad is reported as saying that "there is no reason for Moein to be disqualified by the GC". However, Moein's supporters are well aware of the fact that the GC never needs a 'reason' to disqualify a potential candidate. We have not forgotten that the GC did not offer any reason when it disqualified hundreds of 'moderates', many of whom had affiliations with the IIPF, in the last parliamentary elections. This concern is implicit in what Shakouri Rad said yesterday: "before the Leader announcing the maximum participation strategy [...], there was a suspicion [i.e. we were concerned] as to whether the GC would act in the same way as it had during the seventh parliamentary elections, but now after such a strategy has been brought up, disqualification of major candidates will be seen as a damage to that strategy". In other words, we are still concerned but at least this time we have the words of the Leader to rely on in arguing against probable disqualifications.
In fact, the message Moeins supporters want to send to the GC is that if you disqualify our candidate you would be acting against what the leader is demanding. But there are two points here: first, in the previous (Majlis) elections, President Khatami and Mr. Karoubi (then Majlis speaker) held meetings with the GC members (Ayatollah Jannati in particular) to convince 'him' that the leader was of the view that the GC should be more generous to the 'reformists' candidates. They did not succeed, as we now know. Second, it seems that Shakouri did not understand, or perhaps is deliberately misreading, the leader. By 'maximum participation' the leader doesn't mean a 'democratic' election where every group and party would be able to nominate a candidate. He is simply hoping that as many people will turn out to vote as they did in past two presidential elections, so that the regime can maintain its 'democratic face'. Thus, the IIPF has better part with its illusions. The GC will not treat their candidates any differently this time.

Iranian Newspapers Review - February 22 & 23, 2005

2005-02-22T14:44:00.000-08:00

Kayhan reports that six new members have now joined the “Council for Coordinating Revolutionary Forces” (Shoraye Hamahangiye Niroo Haye Enghelab). According to Kayhan, the purpose for this new addition was to “better enhance consensus” among the members of the council. The new members are: Gholam Ali Haddad Adel (Majlis Speaker and the father of Ayatollah Khamnei’s daughter-in-law), Hossein Shariat Madari (representative of Ayatollah Khamnei in Kayhan Institute and Kayhan Daily’s supervisor in chief), Mehdi Chamran (war veteran, currently head of Tehran City Council), Mohammad Hasan Rahimian, Morteza Nabavi (Head of Ressalat daily, member of the Expediancy Council, appointed by Ayatollah Khamnei), and Mostafa Pour Mohammadi. Kayhan reports that the Council for Coordinating Revolutionary Forces has come up with “new strategies” for the upcoming elections, but does not reveal what they are. The new move comes after weeks of ongoing disagreement and conflict within the council which had led some potential contenders (most important of all Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati) to become less willing to follow the Council’s directions. Shargh has a summary of an interview with Dr. Mostafa Moein, potential contender backed by “Islamic Iran Participation Front” (Jebheye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Eslami). In a notable remark, Moein says that if he had been in President Khatami’s position, “he would have not lost the opportunity to talk to Clinton at the UN” in 1998. In his view: “ a president who has the support of a nation must observe the basic principles of ‘sociability’ [sic](diplomacy?) when facing more important global figures, and must not avoid them”. It is interesting to note the terms used by Moein in referring to the act of his former boss (Moein served under Khatami as minister for science, research and technology from 1997 to 2003). Accusing the President of not being enough ‘sociable’ in his interactions with foreign figures and underestimating the Iranian president’s office as being less important than its pairs do not sound proper for someone who intends to run for presidential elections in June.